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The Science of Disguise
Abstract
Technological advances have made digital cameras ubiquitous, to the point where it is difficult to purchase
even a mobile phone without one. Coupled with similar advances in face recognition technology, we are
seeing a marked increase in the use of biometrics, such as face recognition, to identify individuals. However,
remaining unrecognized in an era of ubiquitous camera surveillance remains desirable to some citizens,
notably those concerned with privacy. Since biometrics are an intrinsic part of a person's identity, it may be
that the only means of evading detection is through disguise.
We have created a comprehensive database of high-quality imagery that will allow us to explore the
effectiveness of disguise as an approach to avoiding unwanted recognition. Using this database, we have
evaluated the performance of a variety of automated machine-based face recognition algorithms on disguised
faces. Our data-driven analysis finds that for the sample population contained in our database: (1) disguise is
effective; (2) there are significant performance differences between individuals and demographic groups; and
(3) elements including coverage, contrast, and disguise combination are determinative factors in the success
or failure of face recognition algorithms on an image.
In this dissertation, we examine the present-day uses of face recognition and their interplay with privacy
concerns. We sketch the capabilities of a new database of facial imagery, unique both in the diversity of the
imaged population, and in the diversity and consistency of disguises applied to each subject. We provide an
analysis of disguise performance based on both a highly-rated commercial face recognition system and an
open-source algorithm available to the FR community. Finally, we put forth hypothetical models for these
results, and provide insights into the types of disguises that are the most effective at defeating facial
recognition for various demographic populations. As cameras become more sophisticated and algorithms
become more advanced, disguise may become less effective. For security professionals, this is a laudable
outcome; privacy advocates will certainly feel differently.
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ABSTRACT
THE SCIENCE OF DISGUISE
Katherine L. Gibson
Jonathan M. Smith
Technological advances have made digital cameras ubiquitous, to the point where it is
difficult to purchase even a mobile phone without one. Coupled with similar advances in
face recognition technology, we are seeing a marked increase in the use of biometrics, such
as face recognition, to identify individuals. However, remaining unrecognized in an era of
ubiquitous camera surveillance remains desirable to some citizens, notably those concerned
with privacy. Since biometrics are an intrinsic part of a person’s identity, it may be that the
only means of evading detection is through disguise.
We have created a comprehensive database of high-quality imagery that will allow us
to explore the effectiveness of disguise as an approach to avoiding unwanted recognition.
Using this database, we have evaluated the performance of a variety of automated machine-
based face recognition algorithms on disguised faces. Our data-driven analysis finds that
for the sample population contained in our database: (1) disguise is effective; (2) there are
significant performance differences between individuals and demographic groups; and (3)
elements including coverage, contrast, and disguise combination are determinative factors
in the success or failure of face recognition algorithms on an image.
In this dissertation, we examine the present-day uses of face recognition and their inter-
play with privacy concerns. We sketch the capabilities of a new database of facial imagery,
unique both in the diversity of the imaged population, and in the diversity and consistency
of disguises applied to each subject. We provide an analysis of disguise performance based
on both a highly-rated commercial face recognition system and an open-source algorithm
available to the FR community. Finally, we put forth hypothetical models for these results,
and provide insights into the types of disguises that are the most effective at defeating facial
recognition for various demographic populations. As cameras become more sophisticated
and algorithms become more advanced, disguise may become less effective. For security
professionals, this is a laudable outcome; privacy advocates will certainly feel differently.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Biometric identifiers are measurable characteristics, most often physical, that can be used
to uniquely represent and identify an individual. The use of biometrics as a means of unique
identification was pioneered by Juan Vucetich in 1981. Vucetich began the first fingerprint
files while employed as an Argentinian police official [60]. Other common biometric iden-
tifiers include not only face and iris recognition [37], but also DNA [151], voice [130],
and gait [133, 156] recognition. Even characteristics such as vein patterns [96, 157], ear
shape [20, 27], knuckle texture [129], and body odor [165] can be used as biometric iden-
tifiers [78].
Biometric systems use one or more of these unique characteristics to identify individ-
uals for a variety of purposes, such as authentication [31], recognition [161] and foren-
sics [32]. Unlike fingerprints, DNA, and many other biometrics, face recognition (and
related techniques such as gait recognition [133, 156]) can be employed without subject
engagement [10]. This makes face recognition (FR) an especially suitable biometric for
use by security and law enforcement. It also raises concerns over privacy, particularly as
face recognition system performance has steadily increased [12, 67, 123, 125], and the use
of face recognition as a surveillance tool has become more common.
Biometric data is inherently personal and cannot be easily changed or replaced as one
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would do with a lost password or a stolen credit card. Once an attacker has a copy of a
subject’s biometric data, it is difficult (if not impossible) for the subject to ever be “trusted”
again in any system that uses that previously stolen data for authentication. Furthermore,
the possibilities for abuse are rampant, ranging from identity theft to tracking an individ-
ual’s every move, and the laws do not currently address biometric data exploitation [41].
In this work, we have gathered a database of disguised faces, the DISGUISED FACE
DATABASE (or DFACED), which is unique in its diversity of subjects and wide array of
poses and applied disguises. We use DFACED to examine the efficacy of disguise as a
means of recognition prevention, using both commercial and open source face recognition
software. We provide analysis on the performance of the disguises between different demo-
graphic groups, the effectiveness of disguises alone and in combination, and a phenomenon
we have termed Intra-Disguise MisClassification (IDMC). We also present a number of
hypothetical models for these results, based on previous research findings. Finally, we enu-
merate additional investigations that are made possible by DFACED, which may help the
field of face recognition research move forward.
1.1 Background
In contrast to passwords, access cards, or PINs, which allow you to authenticate based on
“what you know” or “what you have,” biometric data like fingerprints, iris scans, and face
recognition use “who you are” to grant access. For this reason, biometric data is more
difficult to forge, fake, steal, or even forget than traditional authentication credentials, and
hence many businesses and governments are turning to biometric systems for increased
security. These systems have become a primary means of identification in forensics [32],
and their use in authentication and recognition has also risen rapidly [31, 161].
Face recognition is a skill that humans exercise dozens, if not hundreds, of times a day;
we use it to recognize friends and family, and to judge the gender, age, and temperament
2
of those with whom we interact. While humans are almost uncannily adept at recogniz-
ing those persons familiar to them, we are not nearly as skilled at recognizing unfamiliar
faces [138]. Even with an easier task, such as judging the similarity between a pair of
(unfamiliar) faces, many facial recognition algorithms outperform humans [125].
The ability to perform face recognition from a distance without the subject’s cooper-
ation or knowledge [17] makes FR an especially powerful biometric. Additionally, face
recognition has seen a steady increase in both accuracy and speed [12, 67, 123, 125] in
recent years. Given this, it is unsurprising that security and law enforcement increasingly
use FR as a surveillance tool.
1.1.1 Terminology
In this section, we will define some of the terminology used when discussing face recog-
nition, and attempt to clarify commonly confused terms. In doing so, we will also briefly
discuss the underlying workings of FR systems in general, and present common use sce-
narios.
Fundamental Terminology
Each face recognition system uses an enrollment database, in which gallery images of
subjects are stored. A gallery image (or set of images) is connected to an identity, specified
when a person is initially enrolled in the database. Ideally, gallery images are taken under
circumstances in which such things as lighting and viewing angle can be controlled. How-
ever, in the case of an enrollment database based on data from overhead security cameras
or low quality mug shots, this may not be possible.
Probe images are images of unknown or unverified subjects for which a face recogni-
tion system attempts to find a match. The most common goal in face recognition is to match
a probe image with an image from the enrollment database. This matching can be broken
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down into two separate tasks: verification (a one-to-one comparison) and identification (a
one-to-many comparison).
Verification occurs when a user presents her identity along with an image of her face.
If the presented probe image matches the gallery images associated with the presented
identity, the FR system will accept the claim. On the other hand, if the probe and gallery
images do not match, the verification claim is rejected by the FR system.
For example, when an employee begins work at a company that uses facial recognition
to control building access, images of her face are taken on the first day. These images
are stored in the enrollment database, and are associated with her identity. When she at-
tempts to enter a building that has facial biometrics-controlled access, a probe image of
the employee’s face is captured by a nearby camera, and her identity claim is presented
via her badge or swipe card. The FR system matches the captured probe image with the
employee’s gallery images, and grants her access when the match returns true.
Identification involves a facial image being presented, without the associated identity
claim. In this case, the face recognition system will need to find a match (or a list of
likely matches) from the enrollment database [122]. Of the two tasks, identification is the
more difficult, as it involves a one-to-many comparison, instead of the simple one-to-one
comparison for verification. In fact, identification can also be viewed as a large number of
verification tests (i.e., many one-to-one queries).
As an example of identification, a mug shot taken by the police may be run through state
or national databases to identify an uncooperative arrestee. Even in cases where a name
is supplied, running identification could also return any outstanding warrants or previous
arrests that may be stored under a different name.
Process Terminology
Before face recognition can be performed, however, face detection must first occur. De-
tection refers to a system’s ability to locate a face (or faces) in an image, and is a separate
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problem from identification or verification. Face detection suffers from many of the prob-
lems discussed in Section 2, such as poor image quality, objects blocking the face, and
inadequate lighting.
Once a face has been detected, extraction is performed to obtain features. Feature
extraction can be performed in many ways, and is discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.
The main goal is to transform a group of pixels into a smaller amount of data that accurately
represents the distinguishing characteristics of the face. The exact features extracted will
depend on the extraction method, and do not necessarily correspond to actual facial features
(e.g., the eyes, nose, and mouth).
Finally, the term face recognition is often used to refer to the process as a whole. For
example, the terms “face recognition system” or “face recognition algorithm” are used,
even though an FR algorithm is by necessity split into separate detection, extraction, and
identification/verification steps. Occasionally, the media incorrectly uses the term “recog-
nition” to mean the specific task of identification.
Evaluation Terminology
Face recognition is essentially a pattern recognition problem. Whether the task is identi-
fication or verification, the end goal is to locate a correct gallery match for a given probe
image (or to correctly return the absence of a match). There are four possible outcomes: a
false accept (FA), a correct accept (CA), a false reject (FR), and a correct reject (CR) [36].
A correct accept or a correct reject are both desired outcomes, in which a system accu-
rately identifies or accurately responds that there are no matches. A false accept (e.g., the
system erroneously indicates there is a match when there is no actual match in the enroll-
ment database) or a false reject (e.g., the system erroneously indicates there is no match
and fails to recognize a valid user) are unwanted errors. If a face recognition algorithm was
perfect, the rates at which FAs and FRs occur, or the false accept rate (FAR) and false
reject rate (FRR), would never rise above zero.
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The relationship between FRR and FAR is a trade-off; lowering the false accept rate
will necessarily cause the system to be more “cautious,” and will lead to more false rejects.
False rejects can be frustrating to users and cause unnecessary delays in the recognition
process. The reverse is also true, where lowering the false reject rate leads to a more
“careless” system that falsely accepts more subjects. In most use cases, a low FAR is
considered to be more important, since it allows impostors and those who should be denied
access to gain entry.
This trade-off grows more pronounced as the desired rate is lowered further; an FAR of
0% will lead to the system rejecting even very closely matching data, and possibly rejecting
all matches out of hand. Barring a refinement in the algorithm, “any improvement in one
error rate must be paid for by a worsening in the other” [36]. For this reason, the equal
error rate (EER) (sometimes called the crossover error rate), is also of importance; the
EER is the point at which both accept and reject errors are equal. In general, the lower the
EER, the more accurate the biometric system [145].
1.2 Uses of Face Recognition
The contemporary uses of face recognition are numerous, and are growing each day. In
this section, we present a small, illustrative subset of these applications, classified into one
of four categories. Many of these applications can raise concerns about privacy, which is
discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
1.2.1 Law Enforcement
The use of face recognition to assist law enforcement efforts is one of its most well-known
applications, thanks in part to the recent widespread use of FR by government agencies
like the FBI [154] and NSA [131], as well as by local and state police departments [111,
159]. Some police departments are also combining face recognition technology with body
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cameras worn by front-line officers [110], allowing for the possibility of identification on
the fly.
This already occurred at the 2001 Super Bowl in Tampa, Florida, where FR software
was used to scan everyone who passed through a turnstile, without their knowledge [103].
When a likely match for a known criminal was found, images and details were displayed in
a police control room. More recently, the 2015 Download festival in England scanned faces
in the crowd using strategically placed cameras, comparing the images to a Europe-wide
database of custody images [40]. The aim was to identify and apprehend “criminals who
prey on music festivals and steal mobile phones.”
However, employing face recognition successfully in uncontrolled conditions like
sporting events and music festivals can be incredibly difficult. After the Boston Marathon
bombing in 2013, despite the suspects being registered in the Massachusetts DMV
database, the FR system failed to find a match [57]. Although a vast amount of footage
containing the suspects was available, much of it was of low quality, or came from security
cameras whose position and angle was not meant to capture the faces of passers-by out-
side. Additional complications came, surprisingly, from the driver’s license photos, where
a single image is taken from head-on and with bright lighting. The lack of multiple gallery
images, specifically the lack of images from other views, made it difficult to identify a
match using poor-quality probe images. Still, successful use of face recognition to identify
criminals is possible; in 2014 Chicago made its first arrest based on a match made from
surveillance footage [100]. The FBI [61], investigators in Iowa [7], DSS agents [52], and
the Lancaster Sheriff’s Robbery Suppression Team [163] have also made arrests, similarly
aided by face recognition software.
Face recognition is also used for fraud prevention by government agencies like the
Department of Motor Vehicles. When a driver’s license is renewed or issued, many states
issue a temporary card, then run face recognition searches to confirm the claimed identity
before issuing a permanent license [114].
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In many of these cases, the knowledge that face recognition or other biometrics will be
used can be enough to deter lawbreakers. In the same way that CCTV surveillance cameras
can cause statistically significant declines in crime within their view [24, 90], the possibility
of being identified through FR can lower fraud rates. After Indiana’s DMV began using
face recognition technology, they found that the number of fraud cases declined by 50%
within two years [158].
1.2.2 Security
Security measures, such as access control and identity verification, are another application
in which biometric systems like face recognition are used. Everyone over the age of 21
has experienced the human equivalent of this: a bouncer or waitress examines your I.D. to
confirm you are of age, comparing your photo to the face in front of them. Using biometrics
like face recognition for these tasks makes it feasible to more widely implement them, to
streamline the process, and to make it less intrusive for users.
Biometric access control can be used for personal electronics, such as laptops and smart
phones, in the form of fingerprint [59], iris [62], or face recognition [85, 162]. Using face
recognition to bypass the password on a smart phone has been especially popular, with
nearly all of the major manufacturers releasing phones with FR-enabled login. However,
due to the constraints of the system resources, coupled with a desire to reduce user frus-
tration due to false accepts, these systems can still be easily duped [76]. Similar methods
have also been introduced for signing in to online accounts like Facebook and Twitter [19].
Controlling access to semi-private spaces, such as work environments or backstage at
events, is another use for FR [4]. An example of this type of access control was given
earlier in Section 1.1.1, in which an employee is allowed access to her building through the
use of a biometrics-controlled system. Casinos have also turned to face recognition, but
with a goal of preventing access, rather than granting it. FR systems are used to prevent
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both fraudsters [143] and those who have self-banned [53, 152] from costing the casino
money.
Identity verification is another security measure that can benefit from biometrics like
face recognition, and the possible applications are seemingly limitless. One British super-
market chain used FR to implement a system to automatically flag underage patrons who
have previously been denied alcohol or tobacco, and to approve those previously certified
as 18 or older [134]. The use of face recognition to process online payments is already
being used in China, where Alipay uses it to confirm the purchase [82], and MasterCard
will soon be testing a program to reduce online purchase fraud using a similar smart phone
app [117].
Face recognition is being used in more critical applications as well. For example, cur-
rent US passports contain a chip that stores a digital photograph to enable the use of face
recognition [150], and New Zealand allows certain passengers to bypass border control
officers by matching their face to their passport photo [109]. Preliminary research has
also been conducted on the viability of using FR to verify identity for voting, with both
online [43] and in-person [44] applications being considered. Finally, the problem of iden-
tifying patients in hospitals can be increasingly difficult when patients are non-verbal. This
is especially true in the case of newborn babies, whose own parents may have trouble cor-
rectly identifying their child [54]. Preliminary research has shown that the use of face
recognition to identify newborns is a feasible solution [11].
1.2.3 Entertainment and Social
Face recognition is also making its way into people’s personal lives, through social media,
gaming, and the ways in which they interact with the world. Entertainment systems like the
XBox One [95] and the PS4 [1] use face recognition, although not as a means of biometric
security. Instead, they are a convenient way to log in to user accounts, or to distinguish
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between multiple players during a session.
Facebook takes advantage of face recognition to suggest “tags” for identifying people
in photos uploaded by a user [50]. They have acquired a number of FR companies over the
years [75], and have continued to improve their FR system. Recently, Facebook unveiled
an algorithm that has the ability to recognize someone even if the person’s face is not
visible [132]. It accomplishes this by taking into account other semi-unique characteristics
such as hair style, body shape, and clothing.
Face recognition has also been used in a variety of other ways, including “improving
human-robot interaction in service robots” [34]. More unusual uses have also been put
forth, including a (now defunct) dating service that paired users with others who possessed
similar features, on the assumption that such similarity would inspire trust [79]. Or Dog-
gleganger, a website meant to increase the adoption of shelter dogs by scanning a user’s
photo and pairing them with a “similar looking” dog in the database [73].
1.2.4 Assistive
Face recognition is also being used in situations where recalling or recognizing faces is
difficult or impossible. A school in the UK has implemented an “attendance system,” that
frees teachers from manually taking attendance, and provides an accurate accounting of
students and staff in the case of an emergency [107]. Similar technology has also been
used in hotels to help concierges greet repeat customers and high rollers by name [116].
FR technology can likewise help those who suffer from prosopagnosia, a condition
more colloquially known as “face blindness.” Prosopagnosia patients are unable to recog-
nize familiar faces, including family and friends, and must rely on other cues (clothing,
hair style, voice) for identification. An application on a platform like “Google Glass would
[allow a sufferer] to recognize his wife and kids” [33].
Devices to assist the fully blind have also been considered; one example is the XploR
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cane developed by researchers at Birmingham City University [144]. The XploR cane
combines a cane-mounted camera, a database of faces (pulled from social media), and FR
software to identify familiar faces in a crowd. Once a face in the crowd is matched to one
in the database, the person’s name and location are given verbally via headphones, along
with directions to guide the user.
Lastly, face recognition may even be used on non-humans, to assist researchers and zoo
workers in identifying individual animals within a population. So far, the technology has
been tested on chimpanzees and gorillas, with initial tests generating an 83% recognition
rate from a population of 24 chimps [29]. This may also allow researchers to better estimate
how many members of a species live in a specific area, which “is vital if endangered animals
are to be protected effectively.”
1.3 Contributions
In this thesis, we have created a novel database of uniform, high-quality facial imagery,
allowing us to explore the effectiveness of disguise as an approach to avoiding unwanted
recognition. The database, which we have named the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE, fo-
cuses on the use of disguise as it applies to occlusion, rather than transformation. The
disguises chosen cover and obscure portions of the face, in lieu of altering its appearance
via makeup or prosthetics. To this end, the database incorporates a number of disguises:
some chosen for their ability to isolate key facial features, and others for their “realism” as
possible everyday disguises.
The DISGUISED FACE DATABASE was also designed and collected with the intention
of having maximum utility as a resource for other researchers. Accordingly, it includes five
distinct angles of image capture, as well as supplementary collections of images and data
to further increase the usefulness of the database. Furthermore, subjects were recruited
with an emphasis on race, gender, and age diversity; information was gathered about each
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subject’s race, gender, age, and ethnic makeup.
No other database of disguised facial imagery currently exists with these features: (1)
a large variety of disguises, (2) consistently applied across the entirety of the subject pool,
(3) which is diverse across race, gender, and age groups, (4) captured as high-quality im-
ages, (5) from multiple, consistent angles of view. Most importantly, the database will be
made available in full to other researchers, to assist in explorations in the fields of facial
recognition, computer science, vision, and other disciplines. We believe that the database
has the possibility to be immensely useful to the research community, and have already
received a number of inquiries about its availability.
We have used this database to perform a data-driven analysis of the performance of dis-
guises using both a highly-rated commercial face recognition system and an open-source
testing framework. We have already ascertained new and surprising information, in addi-
tion to confirming already-held theories on the effects of disguise on face recognition.
First, our data unambiguously shows that even a simple disguise can be effective at
preventing identification. Further, combining one or more disguise components leads to
a pronounced improvement in disguise effectiveness, even when combining two disguises
that are ineffective on their own.
Second, there exist substantial and definitive differences in disguise effectiveness be-
tween individuals; the differences are especially pronounced when comparing individuals
across race and gender groups, and when comparing those with marked differences in skin
tone. Additionally, these differences in disguise effectiveness are at least partially influ-
enced by both the amount of coverage provided by the disguises, and by their contrast
against the subject’s skin tone.
Third, individual face recognition algorithms react to the use of disguise with vary-
ing degrees of proficiency, causing the effectiveness of individual disguises to be at least
partially dependent on the face recognition methods employed.
Finally, by taking advantage of these differences in performance across subjects and
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face recognition algorithms, there exist multiple avenues through which disguise can be
effectively exploited to prevent identification. These methods include preventing initial
detection of the face, “tricking” the system into accepting false features, and overwhelming
the system with a large number of erroneous “matches.”
The results we present in this dissertation show what can be achieved with the DIS-
GUISED FACE DATABASE, and substantiate that the database can be used to assist in our
understanding and improvement of both facial recognition systems and the ability of an
individual to avoid detection when it becomes necessary.
1.4 Organization of Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we cover the challenges
that hinder the accuracy of face recognition, including occlusion, under which disguise
falls. In Chapter 3, we discuss the privacy concerns that stem from the use of automated
face recognition, focusing on the importance of privacy, possible future consequences of
increased use of biometrics for identification, and the means through which citizens can
retain their privacy. Chapter 4 discusses related work, first covering databases similar to the
DISGUISED FACE DATABASE, before moving on to well-known FR algorithms, including
those specifically created for identifying occluded faces. Chapter 5 covers in detail the
collection of the images in the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE, including the image capture
system, subject recruitment, a typical capture session, and the reasoning behind each of our
disguise choices.
Chapter 6 presents the final DISGUISED FACE DATABASE product, including statistics
on the size and content of the database; it also discusses some of the challenges we face
during data gathering and post-processing, and how each challenge was handled. Chapter
7 discusses the evaluation of the data, focusing on how each algorithm was run against the
database, and how the data was prepared for use, before briefly presenting some overall
13
results. Chapter 8 further analyzes these results and conducts additional investigation into
and interpretation of the data, drawing preliminary conclusions about the performance of
the disguises and the FR methods used for testing. The chapter closes by positing numerous
hypothetical models for the results discussed. Chapter 9 completes the thesis by discussing
possible future work that could be completed using the data from the DISGUISED FACE
DATABASE. The chapter concludes by summarizing the contributions and conclusions
from the investigations performed within the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Challenges of Face Recognition
There are a number of well known problems that hinder the performance of automated face
recognition systems. Common problems are changes in lighting, which can drastically
change the appearance of the features; pose, the angle at which the head is viewed; expres-
sion, which can distort the features; aging, which can alter faces so severely that they may
be unrecognizable; image quality, which can affect the ability to even detect, much less
recognize, a face; and occlusion, in which portions of the face are hidden from view.
2.1 Lighting and Illumination
Harsh lighting can cause shadows that obscure important facial features, making detection
and recognition of the face challenging. Depending on the direction from which light hits
the face, the eyes, the mouth, or even the entire face may be hidden in shadow. Alterna-
tively, intense lighting can wash out facial features, or create bright spots on the skin that
hamper face recognition. Although darkness may completely hide the eyes and other dis-
tinguishing features, even soft shadows on the cheeks can alter the face’s contour line and
cause problems [13].
Even less dramatic lighting changes between the gallery and probe images can greatly
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affect accuracy. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1, where subjects from the 2002 FRVT [123]
are shown with both indoor and outdoor lighting. For example, different indoor lights, such
as halogen and incandescent bulbs, can emit light that is brighter or darker, or that varies
in light color, all of which can affect the appearance of skin color. It is for this reason that
the United States requires that passport photos be uniformly lit, with no overhead lighting,
and no shadows created from unequal side lighting [149].
Figure 2.1: Photographs of subjects in both controlled, indoor lighting (top row) and un-
controlled, outdoor lighting (bottom row). (Image from the FRVT 2002 Report [123].)
2.2 Pose
For many face recognition algorithms, the ideal angle for the face is “head on,” with the
head untilted, and the subject directly facing the camera. Although small changes in the
orientation do not seem to make a difference, as the head turns left or right, recognition can
become more challenging. Rotating horizontally past 30 degrees removes one of the eyes
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from view [70].
In the 2002 FRVT (Face Recognition Vendor Test), it was shown that once the angle in
which the face is presented approaches 45 degrees side-to-side or 30 degrees vertically, the
recognition rate when matching against a front view can drop by more than 45%. Profiles
are also difficult to work with, and matching a profile view against a front view leads to a
similar drop in the recognition rate [123].
Additionally, “due to the complex 3D structures and various surface reflectivities of hu-
man faces,” the variation due to pose can be very large. For conventional face recognition,
this intra-class variation may even be larger than the inter-class variation between different
subjects [172].
Furthermore, if a face recognition system lacks the ability to handle pose variation,
its non-intrusive nature is diminished, as subjects are obligated to look directly at and
“pose” for the camera. The most logical solution to this problem would involve collect-
ing gallery images for many possible poses, to improve the probability that a probe pose
will match [172]. Depending on the situation though, this task may be tedious or diffi-
cult, and in some circumstances may not be possible at all. Multiple gallery images of each
subject would also require addition system storage capacity, and increase query return time.
2.3 Facial Expression
Given the elastic nature of the face, expressions can distort and contort facial features,
making face recognition more difficult. Neutral expressions provide the least contorted
image of the face, and it is for this reason that the United States and other countries do not
allow smiling, squinting or raising of the eyebrows in passport photos [149].
Different expressions can highly distort the mouth, eyes, eyebrows, cheeks, nose, fore-
head, and chin, making it difficult to identify the person in the photo. The Face Recognition
Grand Challenge dataset [124] contains many examples of facial expressions [16], some of
17
which can be seen in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Examples of expression images contained in the FRGC dataset. (Image from
Bowyer et al. [16].)
2.4 Aging
Unlike fingerprints and some other biometric data types, faces can change dramatically
over time. Performing face recognition on a probe image only 18 months older than the
enrollment image can decrease the correct identification rate by about 10%. Even the ver-
ification rate drops by about 5% when only 18 months have elapsed between enrollment
and the new probe image [125].
As a person ages, the shape, color, and texture of the face changes; wrinkles and lines
appear in the face; the lips may thin; and the eyes and cheeks may become more hollow.
For a particularly striking example of aging, see Fig 2.3, where the iconic “Afghan girl” is
shown next to an image of the same woman 18 years later; both images were captured by
photographer Steven McCurry.
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Figure 2.3: Sharbat Gula, the “Afghan girl”. Image on left is from 1984, at approximately
age 12; image on right is from early 2002, at approximately age 30. (Photographs by Steve
McCurry, copyright National Geographic Society.)
Even with shorter times periods, the presence or absence of facial hair, eyeglasses, facial
piercings and tattoos, or a change in hairstyle can all negatively affect recognition. Addi-
tionally, the image acquisition process and environment may change, leading to changes in
the illumination, image quality, and other factors. The problem can be somewhat alleviated
by keeping the enrollment database up-to-date, but for any sizable database, this is a costly
and time-consuming measure. And for databases like those for wanted persons or missing
children, capturing up-to-date images is by definition impossible.
2.5 Image Quality
Even with an otherwise ideal photograph, a facial image may still be unrecognizable if
the image quality is low. Although humans can recognize familiar faces in very low qual-
ity images [138], this is still difficult for computer-based systems. Poor quality images
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don’t sufficiently distinguish the features, making it difficult for computers to perform face
recognition; a higher resolution yields better performance [125].
Although image quality can be defined in a variety of ways, the most typical measure
is based on resolution, specifically the number of pixels between the centers of the eyes
(as seen in the various FRVT studies [12, 123, 125]). In addition to image resolution,
the compression that an image has been put through also affects its quality. The factors
of compression and resolution compound, which means that for lower resolution images
(those with less than 75 pixels between the subject’s eyes), higher compression is likely
to significantly impact the performance of recognition [89]. In contrast, for higher quality
images even compression ratios of up to 40:1 (using the common JPEG compression) have
little impact [12]. Additionally, compression can also affect luminance and color cues,
which have been shown to be very important in recognition of faces by humans [138], and
hence may also be of importance in computer FR.
Preventing low quality images is technically simple; it requires cameras that take high-
resolution photographs, and the space to store them without requiring compression. For
enrollment databases of limited size, such as a building entry system, these requirements
are entirely feasible. However, replacing all of the security cameras and upgrading the
storage space for a large, well-trafficked complex (e.g., an airport) may be prohibitively
expensive. The problem is exacerbated since resolution drops with distance, necessitating
the installation of additional high-end cameras to adequately cover larger areas.
2.6 Occlusions
Finally, occlusions occur when objects block part of the face and prevent a face recogni-
tion algorithm from using those areas to identify the person. Minor occlusions, such as a
small amount of hair resting on the side of the face or the rims of normal spectacles don’t
normally present a significant problem. Larger or more drastic occlusions, such as dark
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sunglasses, scarves over the mouth and/or nose, and niqabs or other full head coverings,
are more problematic. In addition to clothing and hair, other persons or objects in the pic-
ture can also occlude the subject’s face, especially in crowded public spaces such as malls
or airports. Additionally, other common problems can fall into the category of occlusion,
such as shadows caused by poor lighting, or poses which hide parts of the face from view.
Occlusion is one of face recognition’s most challenging problems, and is commonly
seen in real world scenarios [42]. The difficulty of occlusions combined with their preva-
lence makes this an important field of study, and many databases contain occluded im-
ages for study. Some, such as the 1998 AR Face Database [101] and IIIT-Delhi’s ID V1
database [38, 39] contain occluded or disguised images by design. Others, such as Labeled
Faces in the Wild [71] include occluded images due to their ubiquitousness in everyday
experience. These and other databases are discussed further in Section 4.1.
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Chapter 3
Privacy Concerns
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and more recently the 2013 Boston Marathon bomb-
ing, FR and other biometric-based means of identification have increasingly come under
public scrutiny. The public realized that FR technology “could become a valuable tool in
fighting terrorism,” but that it also has “great potential for enabling government invasion of
privacy” [15].
These technologies can clearly be used to increase security, prevent tragedies, and in-
vestigate crimes, but their use necessitates the gathering of information previously thought
of as private. Specifically, the anonymity of the crowd that has historically been available to
individuals in public is now increasingly transformed into massive public monitoring that
separates individuals from the crowd around them. Although there is the common refrain
of “I don’t care, I have nothing to hide.” This attitude can become a slippery slope that can
lead to the erosion of privacy, and ultimately to an Orwellian dystopia.
This section discusses the importance of privacy in contemporary society, the current
and historic necessity of reasonable “invasions” of privacy to maintain safety and security,
possible consequences of the continued erosion of privacy for the future, and what normal
citizens can do to retain their privacy.
Privacy, and the reasonable invasion of privacy to protect society, has been the subject of
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centuries of public policy debate, legal theory, and scholarly writing. In the United States,
these two opposing concerns are addressed in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.
It provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause[.]” This single sentence sets up the basic framework
for safeguarding privacy while still protecting society.
First, citizens only have an expectation of privacy in certain circumstances (e.g., when
they are inside their houses or composing personal writings). Second, the Constitution
only prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, in essence acknowledging that some
searches are indeed reasonable. Last, it sets up a process for the government to legally
invade a person’s privacy in order to protect society, as long as the government first procures
a warrant.
Unfortunately, these principles are far easier to state than to apply in everyday situa-
tions. Privacy is a complex subject, and the laws have not always agreed, nor been con-
sistent, on when privacy is truly private. As technology advances, the laws must adapt,
but they always seem to have a delayed reaction. This was true with respect to wiretapping
telephone lines, and it continues to be true for internet privacy, as well as video surveillance
and similar technologies.
3.1 Importance of Privacy
At its heart, privacy is about an individual’s ability to control outside access to his or her
personal information. This includes protecting information about the people to whom we
speak, the topics we discuss, the websites and physical locations we visit, the views we
hold, the salaries we make, the contents of our bank accounts, and much more. Privacy
is realized when one is free from unreasonable intrusions into and observations of one’s
personal life and affairs – privacy includes control over what you tell, who you tell, and
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how you tell them.
While new technologies might save us time or money, help us keep track of friends,
or simply be convenient, the more someone else knows about us, whether that someone is
the government, another individual, or a corporation, the more power they may have over
us [141]. Blackmail is an example of this: with access to private, injurious information,
blackmailers can extort money, favors, and compliance from their victims. Although a gov-
ernment is unlikely to blackmail its citizens, “privacy is key to freedom of thought,” [141]
and a lack of privacy may keep citizens from voicing dissenting opinions or discussing
important concerns.
Additionally, prior experience has shown that when given access to private information,
many in society will violate this trust. When this trust is violated, the consequences for
the victims can include embarrassment, blackmail, loss of a career, or death threats [74].
“Public shaming” is a modern form of blackmail that can easily ruin a person’s reputation,
take her livelihood, or even take years from her life [94].
3.1.1 Privacy In Public
Although not mentioned in the Constitution by name, in recent history a “right to pri-
vacy” has been consistently recognized by the courts. As previously mentioned, the Fourth
Amendment guarantees protection against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” In the
1967 wiretapping case of Katz v. United States, the United States Supreme Court ruling
extended Fourth Amendment protection to all areas where a person has a “reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.” [148]
Most would argue that an entirely public space, such as the streets and public buildings
we each walk through every day, are not places where we would have this reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. In practice, though, the anonymity of the crowd, or a sense of “privacy
in public,” is what prevails. Although anyone could observe your actions or eavesdrop on
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your conversations, most people on the street will pay little attention to you, as long as your
actions appear ordinary.
However, when these public spaces are invaded by CCTV cameras that capture bio-
metric data which is then combined with face recognition software, the situation changes.
With the addition of this technology, the circumstances are much more similar to “being
followed by an investigator who is keenly interested in what you, in particular, are doing,
and who is taking meticulous notes.” [6] The key difference between the two situations is
the ability to individually identify you: strangers on the street may not be able to, but a pri-
vate investigator or sufficiently advanced FR software can. This ability to attach an identity
to your actions and follow you over time is what gives value to the data that is gathered by
surveillance, and also what erodes our previous sense of “privacy in public.”
3.1.2 Preventing Abuse and Misappropriation
Because of the very nature of biometric data (validation based on “who you are”) the secu-
rity and privacy of biometric systems are tantamount. Privacy advocates, corporations, and
legislatures are becoming increasingly interested in the policy issues surrounding biomet-
ric technology [98]. Many are now advocating, implementing, or even requiring “privacy
impact assessments” and publishing “privacy policies” on the use of these new privacy-
impacting technologies. As a society, however, we are still struggling to find an appropriate
balance between privacy and convenience, privacy and technology (which often involves a
third party in the middle), and privacy and security.
Misuse of Images
Face and body images can be used inappropriately, with or without regard to the identity of
the person to which they belong. The most common misuse seems to be for the titillation
or entertainment of the camera’s operators, most commonly focusing on women or nudity.
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As an example, in 2008, workers in China were found to be inappropriately using traffic
cameras (whose footage was also uploaded to the Internet for public viewing) by training
them on the bedrooms and bathrooms of nearby homes [21]. In the United States in 2009,
two FBI workers were charged with using mall surveillance cameras to watch teenage girls
undress and try on prom gowns [104]. Last year in the United Kingdom, an airport worker
was issued a police warning after allegedly photographing a female colleague as she went
through a full-body scanner [146].
Secondly, although perhaps less invasive than the first scenario, images or video of
embarrassing events may be inappropriately spread beyond their original recording. As
an example, in 2011 a Pennsylvania woman was videotaped texting on her phone while
walking, and subsequently falling into a mall fountain. Although this footage should never
have left the surveillance video system, the video was posted to YouTube, where it was
viewed over 2 million times [26].
The recent increased demand for police to wear body cameras while on duty raises
similar concerns over citizen privacy. On one hand, the use of body cameras has reduced
the use of police force, and correspondingly the complaints against officers. On the other
hand, there are questions of who controls and has access to the footage, and concerns over
the privacy rights of filmed citizens [120, 160].
Abuse of Information
Biometrics can also be abused to track, harass, and intimidate specific persons. Although
there is no evidence of this occurring yet, we have cautionary tales of similar abuse from
non-biometric-based informational databases, and the potential exists to use biometrics to
stalk or harass.
Since 1967, law enforcement officials in Michigan have used LEIN (Law Enforcement
Information Network). This network of law enforcement databases gives the police access
to vehicle registration databases, driving histories, and similar data. Unfortunately, in 2001,
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several police officers were found abusing the LEIN system to stalk and harass women, to
gain the upper hand in domestic disputes, and to influence local elections through intimi-
dation [47].
In a more extreme case, after Valerie Plame Wilson was outed in 2003 as a CIA agent
by the Bush administration, it was not just the end of her career. She also received death
threats, and those whom she had been working with on intelligence in Iraq were also put in
danger. [74]
Misappropriation of Biometrics
The most worrying of possible abuses is the misappropriation of a person’s biometric data,
due to the immutable “who you are” nature of the data. Though there are currently no
known instances of biometric data misappropriation, all one needs to do is consider the
reality of identity theft, which had over 16 million victims in 2012, and a collective financial
loss of nearly $25 billion [68].
When the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) discovered a data breach earlier this
year, much of the reporting focused on the hackers gaining access to security clearance pro-
cessings and personnel data for tens of millions of federal workers. However, the hackers
also took 1.1 million fingerprints, which are currently employed to run background checks
and verify identities at borders. Still, the main concern is not “how much we’re using fin-
gerprints currently, but how we’re going to expand using the technology in the next 5-10
years.” [155]
Although government officials are unsure of the exact use planned for the stolen finger-
print data, many agree that it’s an enormous counterintelligence threat. Possibilities include
creating physical “copies using latex or similar materials, then [breaking] into fingerprint-
locked devices” [118] containing sensitive or secret information. Another scenario is the
unmasking of undercover agents and investigators – although their names and alleged per-
sonal information can be changed, their fingerprints will provide their true identity.
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Tracking
Finally, there are the security benefits (as well as the privacy risks) of being tracked through
the use of of biometrics. For example, the New York Police Department (NYPD) has
comprehensive recommendations for building access control and monitoring for high-risk
buildings in New York City [108]. The NYPD recommends not only using access controls
to monitor entry to the building and parking garages, but also to monitor a person’s move-
ments within the building, requiring credentials to be provided in order to enter different
areas of the building, including those housing mechanical equipment.
Many of these recommendations could be implemented through the use of biometric
access controls, and indeed if constant credential presentation is necessary, biometrics like
FR, fingerprint, or iris scans would be convenient. After the 9/11 attacks, the need for
this type of security is obvious, especially in buildings that are likely targets for terrorism.
Unfortunately, the possibility for misuse of this information is equally evident.
When biometric data is used to verify an identity, it needs to be compared to the enroll-
ment database. For large, frequently-updating databases such as the US Passport database,
it would make sense to have all entry and exit data stored centrally. Unscrupulous indi-
viduals could use travelers’ various “check-ins” to monitor their movement, and to create
profiles of said travelers [49]. A building security system like the one described above
could similarly “track” a person’s movements for weeks or even years.
Ensuring the truth of claimed identities is also the goal of various biometric-based mon-
itoring products, which are often marketed to large companies. As one provider mentions
in its sales materials, “[b]uddy punching [having a friend ’punch’ an employee’s time card
for them] is something that all companies with remote workers have to deal with.” [72]
Their product promises to “eliminate this practice by using ... Facepunch, which uses fa-
cial recognition technology to verify users.”
Another company markets iris scanning technology as a method for improving se-
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curity to places like law enforcement offices, health care facilities, and banks and busi-
nesses [142]. While it is obvious that each of these industries have multiple legitimate
security concerns, the privacy intrusion for employees and customers (including hospital
patients and prisoners) is worrisome.
Many companies have published “privacy policies” to inform employees and consumers
about how their personal data could be used, and to put limits on the use of that data.
However, these policies will not deter someone intent on misusing the data. For example, a
security guard at a building complex could stalk or harass employees who habitually leave
late. The potential for serious violations of privacy make it clear why members of the public
may want to actively protect their anonymity.
This tracking problem may be compounded when the previously mentioned problems
are also brought into play – a security guard at a building complex could stalk or harass
employees who habitually leave late, for example. All of these situations are grave viola-
tions of privacy, and such examples make it plain why the public may want to protect their
anonymity. These possible violations need to be kept in mind when designing, implement-
ing, or interacting with biometric systems.
3.2 The Necessity of “Invasions”
At the same time, as discussed briefly above, certain “invasions” of privacy are necessary to
maintain security, and ultimately to make our lives easier. For example, the ability to login
in to a smart phone through the use of a fingerprint is much more convenient than typing
in a password or swiping a pattern. And although not machine-based, immigration officers
verify a person’s face against the picture in his passport before allowing him to enter the
country.
Some in law enforcement suggest that “[i]t’s a fine line where you need to protect the
rights of the citizens, but you also are protecting the rights of citizens when you ferret
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out crime.” [86] In other words, while maintaining citizens’ right to privacy is of great
importance, in order to apprehend criminals who would further violate citizens’ privacy
(and safety), some privacy invasions are needed.
Ideally, such invasions would require consent or opting into surveillance, and to a cer-
tain extent this is the case. If one wants to avoid a body scanner or metal detector, they may
“opt out” of taking public air transportation, or entering government buildings. Or if one
does not want their facial image stored in a database, they may “opt out” of having an ID
card, whether it be a driver’s license, school ID, or employee badge. However, opting out
of these types of interactions are less and less feasible, and as the use of security increases,
avoiding invasions of privacy will become more and more difficult. Avoiding surveillance
entirely, would require one to become a recluse; the use of CCTV and the ubiquitous na-
ture of personal cameras on every cell phone practically ensures a person’s image will be
captured when in a public place.
It can be argued that a person is only identified if they are already in an FR database
gallery (i.e., ordinary passengers will not be flagged as terrorists). In this sense, the average
citizen may have their image captured or their person scanned, but as long as they are not
on a watch list and are not carrying dangerous items, these scans and images should be
discarded promptly, and have no impact on their daily lives. However, as we discussed in
Section 1.1.1, a system cannot have a low false accept rate and a low false reject rate at the
same time. In other words, a system calibrated to prioritize identifying persons of interest
will by necessity erroneously flag some small subset of people incorrectly [3]. Therefore,
even if “innocent,” people may be mistakenly pulled aside for questioning, denied entrance,
or have their privacy invaded further.
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3.3 Future Consequences
So far we have discussed many of the problems with the current uses and applications of
biometrics. However, the potential for increased reliance on biometrics in the future raises
the possibility of additional, more deleterious consequences.
3.3.1 “Big Brother”
Although the words “Big Brother” are often used in jest, a society in which every citizen is
under constant surveillance by the authorities is not as remote a possibility as it once was.
Lawmakers’ lack of understanding of the technology and their lack of sensitivity to privacy
matters are of significant concern. For example, in 2001, members of a local city council
approved the use of face-scanning software to identify wanted criminals by scanning all of
the pedestrians on a major street.
However, when questioned about their controversial decision, none of them recalled
passing the resolution, and upon rereading it, one member stated that “the language was
confusing.” [112] A second member mentioned that the “way I read it before, it came across
to me, it was simply an enhancement of what we had.” Although the general public’s un-
derstanding of biometric technology has improved significantly since 2001, the technology
has also matured and become more sophisticated. Compounding this issue, the sheer vol-
ume of decisions that lawmakers and policymakers deal with limits the amount of time that
can be expended to fully understand each issue.
Another concern is that of public pressure and opinion allowing “Big Brother” laws to
be passed in “the heat of the moment.” The USA PATRIOT ACT, passed in response the
9/11 terrorist attacks, is a prime example of such concerns. Many of the changes made
to electronic surveillance provisions were heavily opposed by privacy advocates prior to
the attacks [127]. But following the events of 9/11, many who had previously opposed
these provisions were in agreement with Congress that new legal tools were needed to fight
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terrorism. Legislative proposals were introduced less than a week after the attacks, and the
final bill was signed in late October [46].
Some claim that the PATRIOT Act “removes many of the checks and balances that
prevented both police and the foreign intelligence agencies from improperly conducting
surveillance on U.S. citizens who are not involved in criminal or terrorist activity.” [45]
Similarly, others worry that “the bill increase[s] the opportunity for [the harassment of]
individuals who were merely exercising their First Amendment rights.” [127]
However, even as 9/11 recedes into history, Congress continues to reauthorize a ma-
jority of the provisions passed as part of the PATRIOT Act. Recent leaks about the NSA’s
electronic surveillance (including information about many US citizens) have caused an out-
cry from the public. In turn, this has led Congress to reassess the current balance between
security and privacy; however, there have been few meaningful changes in surveillance
laws. Ultimately, the inability of the law to keep pace with changes in technology increases
the likelihood that we will continue to move toward a “Big Brother”-like society. The pres-
sure for greater security after tragic events such as the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing
only accelerates this process.
3.3.2 The Double-Edged Sword
One of the major concerns over using biometrics for authentication is the extremely per-
sonal and largely immutable nature of “who you are.” Passwords, PINs, keys, bank num-
bers, and SSNs are simply “what you have” or “what you know.” Hence, if they are stolen
or lost or copies are made, it is relatively easy (if somewhat of a hassle) to replace them.
Once used for authentication, biometric information will also become a target of thieves
and scammers – but it cannot so easily be replaced. In other words, “if you are using a
biometric [as a password and it is ’hacked’], you will be stuck with that hacked password
for the rest of your life.” [3]
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This is the double-edged sword of biometrics: they can’t be lost or forgotten, mak-
ing them incredibly simple and effective to use for authentication; but they also can’t be
replaced or changed, and if compromised, they are compromised forever. Although it is
possible to change some biometrics, such as the face and fingerprints, it requires expensive
and painful surgery – even obtaining a new SSN is far easier in comparison.
The problem becomes more serious as biometrics become more commonly used:
“[w]hen your gym, mobile phone company, and doctor all have your biometric details and
those systems become hacked – as they undoubtedly will – remediation of the problem will
prove much more difficult, if not impossible.” [63] Compounding this issue is the storage
and encryption of this data when stored in authentication systems. For example, Master-
Card is planning to allow purchase approval through face recognition, and though they
insist that “the information would transmit securely and remain safe on [their] servers,”
security experts are skeptical of such claims [117].
Finally, the possibility for wholesale identity theft becomes a concern; SSNs and credit
card numbers can be kept confidential, but keeping biometrics like your face, voice, and
fingerprints secret is unachievable. With biometrics, “[y]ou don’t need to know the name,
the date of birth, the social security number. You don’t need to know anything[.] You
simply need to ask them, ‘Look in the camera,’ and in a matter of seconds, their true
identity [is revealed].” [30]
3.4 Retaining Privacy
Given these concerns, and the inevitable rise of biometrics for authentication, how is it
possible for members of the public to retain their privacy, and protect their information?
Although consent to surveillance and awareness of data gathering would be enough in an
ideal world, the very real possibility of misuse may require that citizens consider more
radical measures, like disguise.
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3.4.1 Consent and Awareness
Complaints following changes in privacy settings on social media sites like Facebook [91]
highlight the growing concern over intrusions into our privacy without our consent. No
matter how innocuous or seemingly well-intentioned, these intrusions frequently cause
public uproars – it is clear that the public does not respond well to unwelcome or unex-
pected invasions of their privacy [166]. In light of this response, it is increasingly important
that people are aware of, and consent to, the collection or use of their biometric data.
The designers and operators of biometric systems bear this responsibility, and are ob-
ligated to keep subject privacy in mind [81]. This concept is manifested in the “privacy
by design” movement, which has developed frameworks for “ensuring privacy and gaining
personal control over one’s information.” [25] The first step in protecting privacy is ensur-
ing that subjects know of and consent to the collection and/or matching of their biometric
data. Whether by prominent signage, actively opting in, or signing an agreement, subjects
must be informed when their data is being collected.
Finally, as mentioned before, it is imperative that the biometric data that is captured
be securely stored, to prevent biometrics-based identity theft. The data’s security is deter-
mined by many factors, including the encryption used, the length of time the data is stored,
and how it is transmitted. When designers and operators work with biometric systems, they
must be aware of these factors if subject privacy is to be maintained. They also have an
initial obligation to design biometric systems from the outset with privacy in mind.
3.4.2 Disguise
To prevent identity theft, we shred bills, are wary of phishing emails, and keep our SSN and
credit card numbers private. With the increasing reliance on biometrics for identification,
we may soon need to actively protect ourselves from identification by biometric systems.
The use of disguise to prevent recognition by other human beings has a historical basis
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in military deception [55, 69] and espionage [105]. In this dissertation, we build upon
previous investigations [5, 38, 39] into the feasibility of disguise as an everyday tactic for
avoiding recognition. However, in much the same way that biometrics can act as a double-
edged sword, disguises that prevent recognition can be used for good or for evil.
Citizens desire privacy, and their use of disguise to hide their identity may be devoid of
malicious intent. They may simply desire not to be monitored during their day-to-day lives.
Disguise is also beneficial for military operations and espionage, as previously mentioned.
For operatives who conduct their business in hostile or volatile areas of the world, disguise
can allow them to move about more safely. Undercover police work, such as infiltrating and
bringing down drug dealers or human trafficking rings, also requires the use of disguise,
although the aim is to assume another identity, rather than preventing identification.
However, disguise can also give persons who wish to do harm access to areas and items
that they would not normally be able to access. Some of these infiltrations may be relatively
benign, such as the man who boarded a flight to Canada in disguise to escape from Hong
Kong, requesting refugee protection when he landed in Vancouver [171]. But others have
more nefarious intentions, like the ISIS agents who attacked a Syrian town while disguised
as members of the Kurdish security force [48].
The answer to these problems is emphatically not to shun technology or turn back the
clock on advances in biometrics. While trying to balance privacy and security is a worthy
goal, as biometric technology becomes more sophisticated, it is vital we resist the urge to
think of this as a zero-sum game. More and better technology does not necessarily lead
to less privacy; in fact, greater privacy can be obtained without requiring the abandon-
ment of technological advances. This balance can instead be achieved by “adding” to both
sides of the equation. As biometric technology improves, designers and policymakers must
also take steps to increase the privacy protections and policies concerning the use of these
systems. A comprehensive and detailed understanding of the effects of disguise on FR
technology can add valuable insight to our understanding of both sides of this problem.
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Chapter 4
Related Work
In this chapter, related work in two separate subfields of face recognition will be covered.
First, we will examine face databases that include occlusion that were collected by other
researchers. This includes the AR Face database, Labeled Faces in the Wild, Multi-PIE,
and others. We will then discuss some of the work done on face recognition algorithms,
before moving on to FR algorithms that attempt to address occlusion. Finally, we will
examine the “Other Race Effect,” and how it may affect the performance of FR algorithms.
4.1 Face Databases
There are a wide variety of databases available to face recognition researchers, and the
number continues to grow [65]. In this section we will discuss those face databases that in-
corporate occlusion as a major component, including those that pushed us towards creating
the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE.
4.1.1 AR Face Database
The AR Face database [101] was collected in 1998 by Aleix Martı´nez and Robert Be-
navente, and its title is derived from their first initials. The AR Face database was the first
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significant database of occluded facial images, and contains over 4,000 color images of 126
subjects with various expressions, illuminations, and occlusions.
In the database, 70 men and 56 women participate in two capture sessions, spaced 14
days apart. During each session the subjects exhibit four expressions, are photographed in
four different illumination conditions, and wear two different occlusions (dark sunglasses
or a scarf covering the bottom of the face) under three illumination conditions. A total of 13
images were taken during each session, using a single camera to capture a “head on” view
of the subject. A representative subset of the images can be seen in Figure 4.1; subjects
were not required to remove facial accessories such as glasses.
Figure 4.1: Photos from the AR Face database of a subject in various lighting condi-
tions, and wearing both the sunglasses and scarf disguises. (Image from the AR Face
database [101].)
The AR database is notable because it was the first widely available face recognition
database that employed occlusions that could be used for disguise1. However, due to the
age of the database the images (which measure 720x576 pixels) are of low quality in com-
parison to contemporary database images. Additionally, we believe that the two occlusions
employed and the exclusive use of “head on” views are not sufficient to allow comprehen-
sive testing of face recognition performance against occlusion.
1 Another database, the Chinese CAS-PEAL database from 2003 [58], includes each subject wearing a
few different hats and glasses, but these accessories do not occlude much of the face, and hence would not be
effective as disguises.
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4.1.2 Labeled Faces in the Wild
The Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) database [71] is a collection of over 13,000 unique
images gathered from across the internet. The images are of famous people, whose faces
were detected in the image by the Viola-Jones face detector [153]. Each picture is centered
on a single face, and each of the images is labeled with the name of the person in the
picture. Of the 5,749 individuals in the database, 1,680 of them are represented in two or
more images.
As the name indicates, the images are “in the wild,” meaning that they “were not taken
for the special purpose of face recognition by machine [and] capture realistic settings, with
significant variability in pose, lighting, and expression.” [71] Consequently, many of the
images contain subjects who are partially occluded, whether by hat, hair, eyeglasses, sun-
glasses, or other objects in the image; examples are shown in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Naturally occurring partial occlusion of subjects. (Image from the Labeled
Faces in the Wild database [71].)
However, by its design, the LFW database lacks controlled conditions: subjects are
not consistently lit or posed and expressions vary widely. Additionally, the images are
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limited to 250x250 pixels, further exacerbating the difficult task of face recognition, even
for images without occlusions. More importantly, occlusions are not available for every
subject, and even similar occlusions are different from photo to photo. This makes the task
of evaluating the effect of occlusion of a specific feature or features infeasible.
4.1.3 CMU PIE and Multi-PIE
In 2000, Carnegie Mellon University collected the Pose, Illumination, and Expression (PIE)
database. It contains over 40,000 images of 68 subjects, each captured “across 13 different
poses, under 43 different illumination conditions, and with 4 different expressions.” [135]
Subjects are captured with a neutral expression, a smile, while blinking, and while talking.
Subjects who wore glasses were additionally captured without them in the neutral expres-
sion. The different poses were simultaneously captured across the 13 different cameras; an
example of which can be seen in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: The pose variation in CMU PIE, with nine cameras in horizontal sweep from
profile to profile, and 4 cameras above and below the subject. (Image from the CMU Pose,
Illumination, and Expression database [135].)
The CMU PIE database has several shortcoming, such as the low number of sub-
jects and the single capture session. These prompted the creation of the CMU Multi-PIE
database [66], which addresses each of CMU PIE’s deficiencies.
Multi-PIE, gathered in 2009 at Carnegie Mellon, contains 337 subjects, of which 264
were recorded for two or more sessions, with 129 subjects appearing in all four sessions.
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Multi-PIE encompasses six expressions, 15 poses, and 19 illuminations, with each individ-
ual session resulting in 300 images. Multi-PIE also recorded basic demographic informa-
tion on the subjects, such as their gender, race, and approximate age.
Although the Multi-PIE database clearly transcends the data made available in the PIE
database, it still lacks occlusions. As discussed in Section 2.6, shadows caused by strong
lighting can fall into the category of occlusion. However, the lighting used in Multi-PIE
(seen in Figure 4.4) is not severe enough to be cause occluding shadows.
Figure 4.4: A subsample of the illuminations captured in the frontal view. (Image from the
CMU Multi-PIE database website: http://www.multipie.org/.)
4.1.4 MASKS
The MASKS database [6] was gathered in 2003 at the University of Pennsylvania, with
the intention of conducting research in de-identifying faces for anonymization purposes.
(Its name is an acronym for Maintaining Anonymity by Sequestering Key Statistics.) The
database was gathered with a specific focus on consistency of the photos: subjects were
positioned to be captured as identically as possible. As seen in Figure 4.5, subjects were
captured by three cameras in a total of five poses; illumination and expression did not vary.
In total, there were 303 subjects (51 of which sat for all four sessions), in a total of three
poses.
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Figure 4.5: Angles of subject capture. (Image from the MASKS database [6].)
The resulting face images were precisely annotated, with each of the features (nose,
mouth, eyes, and head shape) manually marked. The results were statistically analyzed in
an attempt to determine an average size for each facial feature and the distances between
them. However, these annotations were also used to artificially obscure the features of a
subject, as seen in Figure 4.6. These occluded features were then tested for effectiveness,
although the focus was on the variation in disguisability between individual subjects, rather
than the overall effectiveness of a given disguise.
Figure 4.6: Examples of artificial feature obscuration. (Image from the MASKS
database [6].)
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Unfortunately, the MASKS database lacks occlusions applied to the subject in reality,
and relies on photo manipulations. This lack of real occlusions makes it difficult to evaluate
the performance of the different images, as each feature is obscured by a perfect rectangle.
The artificial occlusions also have no effect on the rest of the face; for example, a hat may
cast a shadow, or sunglasses may compress the nose.
4.1.5 Singh et al.’s Synthetic Database
In a 2009 paper, Singh et al. presented a face recognition algorithm that they hoped
would be effective against “individuals who use disguises to deliberately alter their ap-
pearance” [137]. In order “to study the effect of various types of disguise on the face
recognition performance, a database which comprises a variety of disguise accessories for
a number of individuals is required.”
Since no such database existed at the time, and creating a database of real disguises
was impractical, the researchers created their own database for testing. This database was
created using the Faces 4.0 software, a facial composite software meant primarily for use
by police agencies to create composite sketches [51]. It contains 100 subjects, with 40
frontal face images each; a sample of the images can be seen in Figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.7: Sample of faces from the synthetic database. (Image from Singh et al.’s pa-
per [137].)
4.1.6 IIIT-Delhi Databases
Since the initial gathering of the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE, researchers at the In-
draprastha Institute of Information Technology, Delhi (IIIT-D) gathered two databases of
disguised images. The first is the IIIT-Delhi Disguise Version 1 face database (ID V1),
which consists of 681 images taken of 75 subjects in the visible spectrum [38, 39]. The
second is the IIITD In and Beyond Visible Spectrum Disguise database (I2BVSD), which
contains 681 image pairs, with one image in the visible spectrum, and the second in the
thermal spectrum, as seen in Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8: Pairs of subject captures in both the visible and thermal spectrums. (Image
from the I2BVSD database [38].)
Unfortunately, both databases are limited by their subject pool, which is relatively small
at 75 participants, and lacks any racial diversity. It also is very heavily skewed towards
subjects under 30 (around 90%), and less than a quarter of its subjects are women. Addi-
tionally, the database does not include a uniform disguise set that is applied to all subjects;
subjects were asked to disguise themselves. While this provides more variation across in-
dividuals, it also makes it challenging to evaluate a single disguise’s performance across all
subjects.
4.2 Face Recognition Algorithms
There have been many survey papers written on face recognition algorithms [16, 77, 113,
170, 173], and we do not aim to duplicate their work. Instead, we will give a brief overview,
covering a few key algorithms as examples, before focusing on algorithms that address the
problem of occlusion specifically.
Face recognition algorithms can be largely broken down into one of two main cate-
gories: feature-based and holistic [77]. Featured-based methods focus on locating and
extracting features (typically facial features such as the eyes, nose, etc.), before computing
their geometric relationships. Holistic methods focus on a global representation of the face,
attempting to use the face as a whole, rather than dividing it into parts.
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As we will see, one of the major hurdles is the high dimensionality of a raw facial
image [77]. In a photograph, each pixel in the image is a separate dimension; additionally,
a naı¨ve pixel-to-pixel comparison is wholly ineffective for face recognition. Many of the
algorithms discussed here begin by reducing this dimensionality to meaningful parameters
that can be more easily and accurately compared.
4.2.1 Featured-Based Methods
In 1973, Kanade [83] used simple image processing methods to solve the problem of di-
mensionality by reducing the face to 16 facial parameters. These parameters included ratios
of distances, areas, and angles, and Kanade employed Euclidean distance measures to per-
form matching.
Knowledge-based FR was an early feature-based method that relied on the researcher’s
knowledge of human faces to derive simple rules that describe facial features and their
relationship to each other. The symmetry of the face (two eyes, and a balanced shape to the
nose and lips) is one obvious example from which rules can be derived.
A major problem with this approach is the difficulty of defining exactly how humans
perform face recognition, which is an incredibly challenging problem in and of itself [138].
Translating this precarious understanding into well-defined rules for an algorithm to rely
on only heightens the difficulty. Additionally, the level of detail for the rules can heavily
effect the outcome: too strict (or detailed) and the algorithm will produce false rejects; too
relaxed, and it will see faces where there are none. Despite this difficulty, a number of
researchers, including Yang and Huang [169] as well as Kotropoulos and Pitas [88], have
implemented knowledge-based methods of face detection. However, this method is not
very accurate by the standards of contemporary FR algorithms, and no new knowledge-
based methods have been formally investigated in recent years.
The use of geometric features for face recognition has also been used by Brunelli and
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Poggio [18], who used 35 geometric features to improve performance; Graf et al. [64] used
a modified log Gabor algorithm to create a pose invariant system; Sirohey et al. [139],
extracted the eyes, mouth, and nose using edge detection; and Leung et al. [93], used local
feature detectors and random graph matching to detect a face, using the eyes, nostrils, and
philtrum (the vertical groove between the nose and upper lip).
Elastic Bunch Graph Matching (EBGM) by Wiskott et al. [164] is another feature-
based approach to face recognition. EBGM captures the important features of the face
by representing faces through labeled graphs, where each node refers to a specific facial
landmark (e.g., the corners of the mouth, the pupils, etc.). A small set of graphs based
on a few faces are manually generated; from this set, a facial bunching graph is created,
which covers the local variations for each facial landmark. Once the facial bunching graph
has been created, graphs for new images can be generated automatically, eliminating the
need to manually set the points for each new facial image. Matching is done via graph
similarity, and the method allows for adaptations to small changes in pose (up to about 22
degrees) [121].
4.2.2 Holistic Methods
One of the first holistic-based approaches to reducing the dimensionality was the use of
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) by Sirovich and Kirby [140]. This work was con-
tinued by Turk and Pentland [147], who used the eigenvectors created by PCA to build
“eigenfaces.” Every face image enrolled in a database can be represented exactly as a
combination of these eigenfaces, described by a weight vector; all of the enrolled images
together describe a face space.
Using PCA-based face recognition on a new probe image involves encoding it as a
representation of the eigenfaces, and determining its place in the reduced dimensions of
the face space, which is a relatively fast process. The main drawback to using eigenfaces
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is the need to recalculate the entire enrollment database when a significant number of new
subjects are added; the eigenfaces must be recomputed, and all of the faces must be re-
encoded as a combination of the new eigenfaces. Additionally, PCA depends on pair-wise
pixel relationships; however, information useful for face recognition may be represented in
higher-order relationships among pixels [9].
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) has also been looked at as an alternative to PCA,
because it expressly provides discrimination among the classes [97]. LDA improves per-
formance by choosing a base of vectors that will maximize the interclass differences, while
minimizing intra-class differences. However, LDA only provides better classification than
PCA when a large training set is available [102].
Independent Component Analysis (ICA) is a generalization of PCA. Instead of depend-
ing on the pair-wise relationships between pixels, ICA attempts “to find an independent,
rather than an uncorrelated, image decomposition and representation” [77]. In a paper by
Bartlett et al. [9], the FERET database [121] was used to test two ICA methods. The first
found “spatially local basis images” by treating the images themselves as random variables,
and the pixels as outcomes; the second did the inverse, treating the pixels as random vari-
ables and the images as outcomes, in order to produce a factorial face code. Both of these
methods outperformed PCA in handling face recognition tasks across short-term passages
of time (a number of days) and across changes in expression.
Regardless of the specific algorithms used, however, reducing the dimensionality of
the data is still of paramount importance in many face recognition methods. In general,
holistic methods produce better face recognition results than feature-based methods [77].
However, holistic methods initially assume that all pixels are equally relevant, rather than
immediately extracting detected relevant pixels, as feature-based methods do. This initial
assumption can make holistic methods computationally expensive if the algorithms are not
modified to reduce the initial dimensionality.
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4.2.3 Other Face Recognition Methods
There are also FR methods that do not rely on static two-dimensional images, instead rely-
ing on other forms of data. Discussing these methods in detail is outside the scope of this
dissertation, but we will provide a cursory overview.
Using video sequences for recognition is one such logical use; the video format pro-
vides a large set of images, and increasing use of security cameras (discussed in Sec-
tion 1.2.1) lends relevance. From this set, the system may grab an ideal image (in terms
of illumination and pose), or it may use the additional images to boost its accuracy, or to
refine its training model.
Three-dimensional imagery is another method that has been explored as an information
base for face recognition [16]. The imagery provided by a 3D scan provides additional
information as to the curvature of the face, making pose easier to determine while ignoring
the effects of illumination. The difficulty lies in obtaining clear 3D imagery: the technol-
ogy for this capture is much more expensive and less advanced than that of 2D capture.
Additionally, the increase in information provided by the 3D scan also leads to an increase
in computational complexity and cost [28].
Finally, thermal infrared (IR) or near-infrared (NIR) images reveal additional infor-
mation that may be valuable for recognition, such as the vein structure of the face [35].
However, like 3D sensors, infrared sensors are more expensive and capture less detail than
regular cameras. Further, infrared is opaque to glass, and is by design sensitive to tempera-
ture, which can vary for a wide variety of reasons, including subject health, weather (wind
and rain), and ambient temperature.
4.2.4 Addressing Occlusion
The negative effect of occlusion on face recognition has been heavily studied, with many
algorithms developed to address the problem. Algorithms tackling the problem of occlusion
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generally take one of two approaches: splitting the face into multiple smaller parts, and
working around the occluded areas of the face.
Splitting the Face
An algorithm developed by Ramanathan et al. [128] exploits the symmetry of the human
face to overcome occlusion, whether through disguise, pose, or illumination. They posit
“that the intrinsic facial features and the outer contour captured in one half of a human
face is sufficient for recognition.” The face is detected and vertically split, creating two
halves (left and right). To select the best half of the face, the edge densities on each half are
analyzed, and the half with the higher edge density is chosen. This has the added benefit
of handling both heavy shadows, and illumination saturation where one side of the face is
“washed out” due to intense lighting.
Min et al. [106] use a similar approach to overcome the disguises in the AR Face
database [101] (discussed in Section 4.1.1). As their focus is on sunglasses and scarves,
rather than illumination, they break the face into horizontal halves (the upper half for sun-
glasses, the bottom half for the scarf). A support vector machine (SVM) classifier is used
to determine the presence of an occlusion in each half. Then, having used local binary
patterns (LBP) on the gallery images to obtain an LBP feature space, they extract an LBP
histogram from the non-occluded facial halves. Compared to the application of LBP alone,
Min et al.’s detection and subsequent discounting of disguises portions of the face leads to
superior results.
Dhamecha et al. [39] worked with their ID V1 database (discussed previously in Sec-
tion 4.1.6), which contains a variety of disguises including sunglasses, fake facial hair,
wigs, and hats. Their algorithm breaks images (both gallery and probe images) into a 5x5
grid of pieces, called “patches.” These patches are then classified into into biometric and
non-biometric classes, using intensity values in the patch images to distinguish the two
classes. Once the patches have been classified, only patches that are mutually biometric in
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the images are compared, using LBP. See Figure 4.9 for an example.
Figure 4.9: Example of mutually biometric patch comparison between two images. (Image
from Dhamecha et al.’s paper [39].)
Working Around Disguises
Wright, et al. [167] propose that for feature extraction, “if sparsity in the recognition prob-
lem is properly harnessed, the choice of features is no longer critical,” providing the sparse
representation is correctly computed and the number of features is sufficiently large. In
other words, sparse representation-based classification (SRC) can be exploited to robustly
handle defects in a facial image, whether due to occlusion or to image corruption. This
method works by selecting the subset of all the enrollment images that “most compactly
expresses the input signal” for each probe image, taking advantage of occlusions “corrupt-
ing” only a fraction of an image’s pixels. In tests performed on the AR Face database [101],
recognition rates between 92.0 and 94.7 percent were achieved. They also corrupted a per-
centage of randomly chosen pixels in a number of test images. Even when 70% of the
image was corrupted, the recognition rate stayed above 90%.
Jia and Martinez [80], tackle the problem of occlusions as one of reconstruction, and
include occluded images in both the training and test sets. By doing so, they are able to
linearly combine the training samples “to create a new image that is as close as possible to
the test image,” allowing them to improve the algorithm’s performance.
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Finally, Pavlidis and Symosek [119] suggest that thermal infrared imagery may be of
use in disguise detection. This is of particular importance given the difficulty humans often
have in detecting sophisticated disguises [171], and in recognizing disguised persons [8].
Due to various artificial materials reducing the thermal signature, thermal infrared imagery
can provide indications of possible disguise usage. Importantly, this may also detect the
effects of plastic surgery, which can be very difficult to detect visibly after the healing
process is complete. However, plastic surgery “may add or subtract skin tissue, redistribute
fat, add silicone, create or remove scars,” all of which affect the thermal signature of the
face.
4.3 Influential Factors in Face Recognition Performance
The “Other Race Effect” is a well-known phenomenon in which a person is generally able
to more easily recognize members of their own race. Although this phenomenon is often
challenged as untrue, or as based only on anecdotes and assumptions, significant scientific
studies have been performed that confirm this effect. As it is out of the scope of this
dissertation, we direct the interested reader to surveys by Malpass and Kravitz [99], and by
Bothwell et al. [14].
Furl et al. [56] raised the question of whether such biases affect computer algorithms for
face recognition, and performed exploratory work on a variety of models. They found that
for PCA-based algorithms, there was an advantage for minority-race faces; they posit that
this is due to the “distinctiveness” of these faces. However, other recognition models were
more accurate for majority-race faces, such as O’Toole et al.’s [115] two-stage memory
model.
The question was further explored in a technical report by Phillips et al. [126], in which
algorithms from Western and East Asian countries were compared. Eight algorithms from
research groups in Western countries (e.g., Germany, France, the US) were tested, and
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the average performance of all of the algorithms (i.e., a Western “fusion” algorithm) was
reported. Similarly, five algorithms from research groups in East Asian countries (e.g.,
China, Japan, Korea) were also “fused,” with their average performance reported.
The algorithms were submitted to the FRVT 2006 [125] face recognition test. Likewise,
the images used for testing were drawn from the FRVT 2006 competition database. When
tested at low false accept rates (similar to those used by most security applications), both
algorithm fusions performed more accurately with same-race faces.
A second test using a smaller data set that was more controlled with respect to age
and gender produced results in which both algorithm fusions were more accurate on White
faces. However, the accuracy advantage of White face pairs is far larger for the Western
fusion algorithm than for the East Asian fusion algorithm. The experiments suggest that
state-of-the-art machine recognition algorithms are affected by the demographics of the test
population used to train the algorithms
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Chapter 5
Data Collection
In this chapter, we describe the system used to capture the images for the DISGUISED
FACE DATABASE (DFACED) data set. This set of high-quality images was taken between
December 2012 and May 2013 at the University of Pennsylvania.
In the next section, we discuss the equipment used to create the DFACED data set.
Next, we describe the disguises in detail, including the motivation for including each dis-
guise. Following that, we cover the procedures used to recruit subjects and then provide a
comprehensive description of a photo capture session. Finally, we discuss the collection of
additional data, to include the second session that many of the subjects participated in.
5.1 Image Capture System
This section describes the equipment and physical setup used to capture the high resolution
images contained in the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE. We knew that the capture of a
disguised data set would be labor-intensive, and aimed to maximize the utility of the data
gathered. To that end, we used multiple cameras to capture the face from multiple angles,
and did our best to ensure the consistency of the images across the data set.
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5.1.1 Hardware
Cameras
The images for the project were captured using five identical Canon EOS 60D [22] Digital
SLR cameras The cameras come with 18.0 megapixel CMOS sensors that produce a maxi-
mum resolution of 5184x3456. Each camera was equipped with an 18-135mm f/3.5-5.6 IS
UD [23] standard zoom lens. Images were shot and stored as uncompressed large JPEGs,
each of which took approximately 5 megabytes of disk storage space.
To prevent light leakage through the viewfinder, electrical tape was applied to the eye-
cup, completely blacking out the viewfinder. This was of particular importance given the
brightness of the 500-Watt lights used to illuminate the subjects. Additionally, each camera
was used to capture an image of a color-calibrated reference card, under the lights that were
used during subject capture. These images were used to manually set the white balance of
each camera, to ensure color consistency throughout the database gathering process.
Remote Control
The cameras were manually fired using Canon RS-60E3 remote switches, connected to
each camera through 12 male to female 2.5mm extension cables. These remote switches
allowed the operator to remotely control all five cameras while remaining stationary during
capture. The switches were impermanently mounted on a small piece of cardboard, using
electrical tape. This impermanent mounting allowed adjustments to be made, which would
become necessary if individual pieces of hardware failed.
Tripods
The cameras were securely mounted on Davis & Sanford Voyager Lite tripods, and tripod-
mounted spirit levels were used to ensure both the camera and tripod were parallel to the
floor. The tripods themselves were taped to the ground to prevent any movement, in the
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configuration described in Section 5.1.2. The tripod bodies were set to a height of 36 inches
above the ground, with the mounting head of the tripod adding approximately another four
inches of height.
Figure 5.1: A labeled diagram of the Davis & Sanford Voyager Lite tripods used in gather-
ing the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE.
Using the tripod’s adjustable center shaft, as seen in Figure 5.1 , the camera could
be adjusted up another 10 inches, which allowed us to accommodate height differences
between subjects. To ensure that all five tripods could be consistently set to the same
height, we labeled each tripod’s central shaft in permanent ink with tick marks from 0 to
40, with the marks spaced approximately 5/16ths of an inch apart.
Lighting
Lighting was provided by two Interfit SXT3200 Tungsten lamps, each equipped with a
500-Watt light bulb. Due to inconsistencies in the light provided by the overhead room
55
lighting, the overhead fluorescent lights in the room were turned off during sessions; the
sole illumination came from the two umbrella lights.
We attached both lamps to stands that positioned them approximately four feet off the
ground; the lamps were not adjusted to individual subjects’ height. One lamp was set up
to reflect the light off the inside of a silver lighting umbrella, bouncing the reflected light
onto the subject. The second lamp was coupled with a translucent white umbrella, with the
lamp pointed towards the subject, and the light emitted diffused through the umbrella.
5.1.2 Room Layout
To maximize the future value of the database, we used five separate cameras to capture
each subject from five different angles. We arranged the five Canon EOS 60D cameras in
a semicircle four feet away from the center of the subject’s head, as shown in Figure 5.2.
The cameras are labeled c1 though c5, with c1 on the subject’s right hand side. Cameras
c1 and c5 took profile shots at 0 and 180 degrees from the subject; cameras c2 and c4 took
half-profile shots at 45 and 135 degrees, and camera c3 took head-on shots from directly in
front of the subject, at 90 degrees.
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Figure 5.2: Overhead view of the capture equipment with labeled cameras.
The 500-Watt Tungsten lamps were positioned outside the semicircle of cameras. The
lamp attached to the silver reflective umbrella was placed between cameras c3 and c4.
Between cameras c2 and c3, we place the lamp attached to the translucent white umbrella.
Figure 5.3 shows the DFACED setup as it appeared from the operator’s perspective from
behind camera c3’s position.
A white sheet was used to cover the entirety of the back wall, providing a clean, plain
backdrop for the images taken by cameras c2, c3, and c4. Behind camera c1, a white
poster board was taped up to provide a white backdrop for the shots taken by camera c5.
An identical poster board behind camera c5 provided a white backdrop for camera c1’s
shots. With the combination of the white sheet and two poster boards, all five cameras had
a similar uniform, white background behind the subject.
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Figure 5.3: The view of the setup from the operator’s perspective behind camera c3.
In Figure 5.3 above, the cameras have not been mounted on the tripods; if mounted,
camera c1 would be on the far left, and camera c5 on the far right. Both of these cameras,
along with cameras c2 and c4 are obscured from view by the two umbrella lights. The
translucent white umbrella is on the left, between cameras c2 and c3. The silver reflective
umbrella is on the right, between cameras c3 and c4, although only its black backing is
visible from this angle.
5.1.3 Photographing
Due to space and time limitations, we elected to capture shots consecutively from each of
the cameras, rather than simultaneously from all five cameras. These consecutive shots
were controlled by the operator from behind camera c3, using the remotes discussed in
Section 5.1.1.
Although there can be advantages to simultaneous shots, synchronization of multiple
cameras requires constant monitoring, as well as the expertise needed for initial setup;
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these complications outweighed the possible benefits. Firing all five cameras individually
in succession took no more than 10 seconds, a short enough time frame to prevent lighting
changes or any substantial subject movement.
The cameras were set to take continuous pictures at a maximum rate of 5.3 frames per
second, and each camera was fired long enough to take at least five continuous pictures for
each desired shot. This succession of images maximized the chance of catching at least
one image without serious flaws. The specifics of the camera settings are discussed in
Section 6.3.2.
Cameras were manually fired, in order, from the subject’s right to left (camera c1 to
camera c5); the combination of continuous firing and consecutive capture meant that a
minimum of 25 images (five per camera) were taken for each pose. In cases where the
subject was observed to be blinking, talking, or not facing camera c3, images were retaken.
An example of the images captured by each of the cameras are shown in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: The images captured by each of the cameras, starting with camera c1’s image
on the left (which shows the right side of the subject’s face) and continuing to camera c5’s
image on the right.
5.2 Choosing the Disguises
The DISGUISED FACE DATABASE uses six disguise components: sunglasses, a baseball
hat, a fake mustache, a surgical face mask, a domino mask, and an adhesive eyepatch. From
these six components, DFACED contains a total of 28 different disguise combinations.
The disguise components were chosen to fit into two main categories: isolation dis-
59
guises and realistic disguises. Isolation disguises isolate key facial features and areas of
the face to allow for testing on the importance of these features in face recognition. Real-
istic disguises simulate attire that might be commonly worn in public (not necessarily as a
disguise), to test the effectiveness of “normal” attire at preventing face recognition.
Where possible, we used disguises with a bright green coloration. We knew that no
subject’s hair or skin would blend in with the bright green, and that it would be relatively
easy to “remove” any green disguises with an image editor if this was deemed necessary
for future tests.
This section describes in detail each of the six chosen disguises, and discusses the
consideration put into choosing each of them. The figures in this section include images of
each disguise component worn by a “dummy” subject, discussed in detail in Section 5.6.3.
We also specify the abbreviation used for each disguise component within the database;
these abbreviations can also be seen in Appendix A.
5.2.1 Sunglasses
The sunglasses disguise component, seen in Figure 5.5, is in fact four separate pairs of
sunglasses, each with either white or black frames, and dark or clear lenses. Other than the
color of the frames and lenses, the four pairs of sunglasses are identical in terms of shape
and size. The frames are 1.75 inches high and 5.5 inches wide, and the earpieces are 6
inches long; the lenses are each 1.5 inches high and 1.75 inches wide.
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Figure 5.5: The four different pairs of sunglasses used in the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE.
Each of the pairs of sunglasses uses a different abbreviation: black frames with dark
lenses (abbreviation “Sbd” which stands for “Sunglasses, black, dark”), black frames with
clear lenses (“Sbc”), white frames with dark lenses (“Swd”), and white frames with clear
lenses (abbreviation “Swc” which stands for “Sunglasses, white, clear”). It is important
to note that when used as part of a disguise combination, only the “normal” sunglasses
with black frames and dark lenses were used; as part of a combination, the abbreviation is
simply “S”.
We chose to include sunglasses in the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE because they are
a very common realistic disguise, one that is highly available and is often found in other
face databases [39, 101]. Sunglasses cover not only the eyes and the surrounding area,
they also (at least partially) cover the eyebrows on many subjects. Additionally, sunglasses
are often high-contrast disguises (e.g., dark lenses or frames on lighter skin), which some
research [5] has shown may lead to better disguise performance against automatic face
recognition systems. For this reason, DFACED uses sunglasses with both white and black
frames, to ensure the capture of at minimum one high contrast sunglasses disguise on all
skin tones.
61
5.2.2 Baseball Hat
The baseball hat disguise component is a green, brimmed baseball hat with an adjustable
velcro closure. The hats measure approximately 11.5 inches from front to back (including
a brim of 2.5 inches), and 8 inches from side to side1. The baseball hats are “one size fits
most,” but we encountered significant differences in fit, leading to variations in where and
how the subjects placed the hat on their head. Please see Section 6.3.3 for more details on
how these variations were handled.
The baseball hat is another realistic disguise, and much like sunglasses, it is an example
often used in other face databases. A baseball hat covers the forehead and top of the head,
and can also disguise the shape of the head. Additionally, the brim of the hat often casts a
shadow, obscuring the wearer’s eyes from view. As seen in Figure 5.6, subjects wore the
baseball hat both forwards (“H”) and backwards (abbreviation “Hb” which stands for “Hat,
backwards”). This will allow investigation into the importance of the brim (and the shadow
it often casts) in disguise effectiveness.
Figure 5.6: The baseball hat used in the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE, worn both forwards
and backwards.
1The measurements of the baseball hat are taken “straight across” the cap, and do not take into account
any curve in the cap’s shape.
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5.2.3 Mustache
The mustache disguise component is an adhesive mustache made of synthetic black hair
(abbreviation “M”). The mustache came in three variations, referred to as small, curly, and
big in the DFACED records. The three variations, seen in Figure 5.7 were of different sizes,
but ranged between 3 and 3.5 inches long, and .75 to 1 inch tall. Subjects were given one
of the three variations at random; if a subject returned for a second session, we ensured
they were provided with a different mustache. Those subjects who already had facial hair
also wore the mustache disguise component, although with varying degrees of success,
discussed further in Section 6.3.3.
Figure 5.7: The three variations of the mustache. (From left to right: big, curly, and small.)
DFACED includes the mustache as a realistic disguise, since many men grow out or
remove their facial hair during their lifetimes. As a disguise, it often obscures the size and
shape of the subject’s upper lip. Female subjects also wore the mustaches, both for the
sake of data completeness, and to allow testing for possible effects on FR systems’ gender
determination algorithms.
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5.2.4 Surgical Face Mask
The surgical face mask is a blue, pleated face mask with elastic loops that go behind the
ears. The masks are one size fits all, and measure 3.5 inches tall and 6.75 inches wide, with
a wire embedded along the top edge that can be bent to allow the mask to conform to the
shape of the nose.
Through the course of collecting the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE, we received three
slightly different variations on the mask: (1) a darker blue mask with a simple wire through
the top; (2) a light blue mask with a simple wire through the top; and (3) a light blue
mask, the wire of which was not as easily flexible as the other two. This did lead to a
slight difference in the way the masks conformed to the face, but we believe it should not
significantly affect results. The differences can been seen in Figure 5.8, both as worn by
the dummy subject, and laid flat on a table.
Figure 5.8: The three variations of the face mask received during the collection of the
DISGUISED FACE DATABASE.
The surgical face mask was chosen as both an isolation disguise and as a realistic dis-
guise [92]. Subjects wore the surgical mask in one of three ways, as seen in Figure 5.9: (1)
as it is meant to be worn, covering the nose, mouth, and chin; (2) with the top of the mask
folded down so that the nose is uncovered; and (3) with the top of mask also folded up, so
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that only the mouth is concealed, while the nose and chin are visible.
Figure 5.9: The three ways in which a subject wore a surgical face mask.
These three styles use the abbreviations “FM1,” “FM2,” and “FM3,” respectively.
When used in combination with other disguise components, the surgical mask was only
worn in the first (full coverage) configuration, and is referred to by the abbreviation “FM”
(which stands simply for “Face Mask”). We added the second and third variations in order
to test the performance of the face mask when major facial features (e.g., nose, chin) are
available for recognition.
5.2.5 Domino Mask
The domino mask is a green, satin-finish mask (abbreviation “DM”), seen in Figure 5.10.
The mask covers the area around the subject’s eyes (up to the forehead, and partway down
the nose), without covering the eyes themselves. The mask measures 3.5 inches tall by
6.75 inches wide, and is held onto the subject’s face by a length of elastic cording attached
to either side of the mask. The masks are one size fits all; although we had issues with fit
between different subjects, at least one eye is always fully visible through the eye holes.
For more details on this issue, please see Section 6.3.3.
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Figure 5.10: The domino mask disguise component.
The domino mask is an isolation disguise: it allows for testing on the importance of
the area of the face surrounding the eyes, while leaving the eyes themselves available for
recognition.
5.2.6 Adhesive Eyepatch
The adhesive eyepatch is a green, oval-shaped adhesive eyepatch that measures 2.25 inches
high by 3.16 inches wide. During collection, there were variations in where and how the
eyepatch was placed on each subject’s face, but care was taken to cover the eye and eyebrow
in all possible cases.
The adhesive eyepatch was chosen as an isolation disguise, specifically for the eyebrows
and eyes. To that end, it was worn in five different configurations, as seen in Figure 5.11, to
allow examination of as many individual features as possible. For each of these placements,
concealing the relevant feature (eye and eyebrow, or eyebrow alone) was given precedence
over the exact placement of the eyepatch on the subject’s face. See Section 6.3.3 for more
details on these difficulties.
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Figure 5.11: The five ways in which the adhesive eyepatch was worn.
The five ways in which the eyepatch was worn are as follows. First, it was worn cover-
ing the subject’s right eye and eyebrow (abbreviation “Er” which stands for “Eye, right”).
Second, the subject wore the full eyepatch on their left eye and eyebrow (“El”). After
this, the eyepatch was cut in half and one half was used to cover the subject’s right eye-
brow alone (abbreviation “EBr” which stands for “EyeBrow, right”). It was also used to
cover the subject’s left eyebrow alone (“EBl”), and both of the subject’s eyebrows at once
(abbreviation “EBb” which stands for “EyeBrow, both”).
5.2.7 Lab Coat
Finally, subjects wore a white lab coat during the sessions. The lab coat was not a disguise
component, but was worn by all subjects during the entirety of their photographic session.
The only exception to this was the first image of the subject in their street clothes. The lab
coat helped to provide consistency between the subjects, similar to the white background
in each of the photos.
5.3 Subject Recruitment
Subjects were recruited via advertisement flyers posted around the UPenn Engineering
complex, as well as through email announcements. Word of mouth was also a prominent
recruitment vector, including an announcement (unsolicited by the researchers) made on
Under the Button, Penn’s student-run news and entertainment blog [2].
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5.3.1 Requirements for Participation
Subjects were required to be “nondescript,” in that they must (1) be willing and able to
remove all accessories (hoodies, glasses, earrings, hats) and (2) not have identifying char-
acteristics above the neck (face tattoos, unnaturally dyed hair, distinguishing facial birth-
marks, or large facial piercings). Exceptions were made for upper-ear piercings with rings,
which were often hidden by hair; small nose studs; and facial moles, which were common
enough as to not be distinguishing. Subjects also needed to be able to follow instructions
with regards to pose, placing disguises, and adjusting disguises. It was also required that
subjects be able to refrain from blinking for short periods of time, long enough for at least
one camera’s set of images to be taken. Sessions took less than 45 minutes, and subjects
were compensated monetarily for their time. Each subject was encouraged to return for a
second compensated session at least 30 days in the future.
5.3.2 Subject Selection
Approximately two-thirds of the subjects self-selected, responding to the various adver-
tisements for the project. However, one of the main goals in gathering the DISGUISED
FACE DATABASE was to achieve significant subject diversity. For this reason, targeted
recruitment was performed to overcome the young, white, male skew that was present in
the engineering student population, from which most of the self-selected volunteers came.
Significant efforts were made to include women, persons over the age of 30, and people of
color. Due to this targeted recruitment, we were able to assemble a rather diverse database
in terms of gender, race, and age. A detailed breakdown of the demographics of the subject
group is included in Section 6.2.
We began with an ambitious recruitment target of 500 subjects, with the goal to have
at least half of the subjects return for a second session (discussed in detail in Section 5.5).
Our final subject count was a respectable 325 subjects, 245 of whom returned for a second
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session.
5.4 A Capture Session
This section provides a complete overview of a capture session, including the data gathered
about the subject, the order of disguise capture, and the number of images gathered.
5.4.1 Session Outset
Upon arrival for a session, subjects were asked to read and sign the informed consent form,
and then to fill out their demographic information. They self-selected their gender, year of
birth, race (White/Caucasian, Black/African American, East Asian, South Asian/Indian, or
Other), and specific ethnicity. For ethnicity, we asked subjects to be as detailed as they felt
comfortable. Many knew their ethnicities down to one-quarter, one-eighth, or more, but
some subjects could only made educated guesses, or left the line blank.
Before the session began, subjects removed their outer clothing, such as jackets, hats,
and hoodies. Subjects were then seated in the chair located inside the semicircle of cam-
eras, and positioned such that their heads were directly between cameras c1 and c5. This
positioning prevented the two profile cameras from “seeing” each other, allowing the cap-
ture of profile shots without a camera body in the direct background. Additionally, it aided
in keeping subjects’ heads the correct distance from camera c3. We did initially experience
difficulty with this positioning, which we discuss in Section 6.3.1.
Once aligned, we adjusted the tripod heights, starting with camera c1, so that each sub-
ject’s head was centered, both vertically and horizontally, within the camera’s viewfinder.
We also adjusted the four remaining tripod heights, using the tick marks discussed in Sec-
tion 5.1.1 to ensure that all five tripods were adjusted to the same height. After all of the
cameras and tripods were correctly adjusted to that specific subject’s height, camera c3 was
used to capture an image of the subject holding a whiteboard with the subject’s number, for
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record keeping purposes.
At this point, we explained to the subjects how the session was going to be run. First,
we explained that when the umbrella lights were switched on, they would be seem bright,
but that the subjects’ eyes would quickly adjust. Second, that the cameras would shoot in
order from camera c1 on their right to camera c5 on their left, and that while the cameras
were shooting, they were to look straight ahead at the middle camera (camera c3). Third,
that it was very important they do their best not to blink while the cameras were shooting,
as long as refraining from blinking did not become uncomfortable. Fourth, that we would
first take a set of images with them in their street clothes, before asking them to come
outside the semicircle to be properly attired for the rest of the session, which would involve
the various disguises. Finally, any questions subjects had at this point were answered.
Photographs of the subjects in their street clothes were taken using each of the cameras.
The focus and quality of the images were assessed for each camera, and any required modi-
fications were made (see Section 6.3.2 for details). After these images were taken, subjects
temporarily left the semicircle of cameras to put a lab coat on over their street clothes and
to remove all accessories. This included pulling back bangs or long hair (subjects were pro-
vided bobby pins and hair ties), and removing glasses, nose studs, and earrings. Makeup
and facial hair were left alone. Once subjects’ faces were “clean,” we asked them to return
to the chair, we rechecked their alignment with the cameras, and the disguised portion of
the capture session began.
5.4.2 Disguise Set Capture
As mentioned earlier, the initial (ambitious) goal was to have 500 subjects enrolled in the
DISGUISED FACE DATABASE, with at least half returning for a second session. Due to the
number of sessions we wanted to run, and the time constraints (the room used for capture
was only available to us for 7 months), we knew that the process of recording a session
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would need to be as streamlined as possible.
For this reason, it was not feasible to include all 164 possible combinations2 of the six
disguise components. Instead, we chose what we believe to be a representative sample,
which includes the six disguise components on their own (including their variations), as
well as 12 disguises that use multiple disguise components. All of the disguises can be
seen in capture order in Appendix A, alongside their abbreviations.
The disguises were broken up into “sets” to streamline the capture session. A large
part of streamlining the sessions was deciding the number of disguise combinations and
the order in which they would be applied. We kept in mind that adhesive and difficult
to adjust disguises should not be moved or replaced more than necessary, that disguises
should not be taken off unnecessarily, and that it would not be possible to capture every
disguise combination.
We describe the 28 chosen disguises and disguise combinations in detail below. Addi-
tionally, between many of the sets, “clean” images of the subject were also taken, in which
the subject wore no disguise. These shots differ from the original shot taken of the subject
in their street clothes, as all facial accessories were removed and the subject wore a lab coat
for the clean shots.
Surgical Face Mask
The first disguise set was the surgical face mask disguise set, which consisted of (1) the
surgical face mask disguise applied normally This was followed by (2) the top third of the
mask being folded down (exposing the nose), and finally (3) folding up the bottom third of
the mask (exposing the chin in addition to the nose). During the remainder of the session,
2To compute this number, we break the face down into three sections; two disguises that cover the same
area of the face cannot be worn at once. For the top of the head, there are two possibilities (baseball hat,
baseball hat backwards); for the eye area, there are 10 possibilities (the four sunglasses, the domino mask,
and the five ways of wearing the eyepatch); for the mouth area, there are four possibilities (three ways of
wearing the surgical mask, and the mustache). Add to this the option of leaving each area undisguised, and
we have 3 * 11 * 5 = 165 combinations. This total includes the face undisguised, and removing that leaves a
total number of 164 disguise combinations.
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when used as part of a disguise the face mask was worn normally, with both the nose and
chin covered.
(1) (2) (3)
Figure 5.12: The surgical face mask disguise set, in order of capture.
Eyepatch
The eyepatch disguise set was second, and began with the adhesive eyepatch being used
to cover (1) the subject’s right eye (and eyebrow), followed by covering (2) their left eye
(and eyebrow). After both eyes were covered individually, we cut the eyepatch in half, and
used the halves to cover the eyebrows independently. We first covered (3) the subject’s
right eyebrow; we then added the other half of the eyepatch to the left eyebrow, covering
(4) both of the subject’s eyebrows. We asked the subject to again wear (5) the surgical face
mask while both eyebrows were covered. Following that, the face mask was removed and
the right eyebrow was uncovered, allowing us to take a picture with only (6) the subject’s
left eyebrow covered.
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(1) (2) (3)
(4) (5) (6)
Figure 5.13: The eyepatch disguise set in order of capture, including the combination with
the surgical face mask.
Sunglasses
The third disguise set was the sunglasses disguise set, and consisted of the subject first
wearing all four sunglasses individually. In order, they were: (1) black frames with dark
lenses, (2) black frames with clear lenses, (3) white frames with dark lenses, and (4) white
frames with clear lenses. We then had the subject wear (5) the black frames with dark
lenses together with the surgical face mask, with the mask situated underneath the glasses
where they overlapped. For the remainder of the session, when sunglasses were used as
73
part of a disguise, the subject wore the black frames with dark lenses.
(1) (2) (3)
(4) (5)
Figure 5.14: The sunglasses disguise set in order of capture, including the combination
with the surgical face mask.
Baseball Hat
Directly following the sunglasses set was the baseball hat disguise set, which began by
adding a hat to the last disguise the subject wore, creating a disguise that combined (1) the
baseball hat, sunglasses (black frames with dark lenses), and face mask. Following that, we
removed the sunglasses, leaving only (2) the hat and face mask. We then removed the face
mask and added the sunglasses back, for a disguise consisting of (3) the hat and sunglasses.
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Finally we removed the sunglasses, giving a shot of just (4) the baseball hat. Following
this, we had the subject wear (5) the hat backwards.
(1) (2) (3)
(4) (5)
Figure 5.15: The baseball hat disguise set in order of capture, including combinations with
the surgical face mask and the sunglasses.
Domino Mask
The fifth disguise set was the domino mask disguise set, which began by having the subject
put on and adjust (1) the domino mask so that their eyes were visible to the cameras.
Following this, the subject added (2) the face mask to the domino mask (over the domino
mask in cases where there was overlap), being careful not to move the domino mask. To
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this we also added the baseball hat, for a disguise combining (3) the hat, domino mask, and
face mask3. A final shot was taken after having the subject remove the face mask, leaving
just (4) the hat and domino mask.
(1) (2)
(3) (4)
Figure 5.16: The domino mask disguise set in order of capture, including combinations
with both the surgical face mask and the baseball hat.
Mustache
The mustache disguise set was the final set, and began by applying a mustache (chosen at
random from the available styles) to the subject’s face. Once a shot was captured of (1) the
3This disguise was not originally included in the capture design, and is missing from the first 32 capture
sessions.
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mustache, we added the domino mask, again having the subject adjust the mask. After a
shot was taken of (2) the domino mask and mustache, the domino mask was removed, and
the baseball hat was added, allowing capture of (3) the hat and mustache. To this, we also
added the sunglasses, creating a disguise of (4) the hat, sunglasses, and mustache. We then
removed the hat, for a final shot of (5) the sunglasses and mustache.
(1) (2) (3)
(4) (5)
Figure 5.17: The mustache disguise set in order of capture, including combinations with
the baseball hat, domino mask, and sunglasses.
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5.4.3 Session Completion
In between all of these sets (with the exception of between the sunglasses and baseball hat
set) we also took clean shots of the subject, wearing no disguises. These images, three
examples of which can be seen in Figure 5.18, differ from the original shot of the subject
in their street clothes. In the clean shot, the subject has removed all facial accessories and
is wearing the lab coat over their own clothes.
Figure 5.18: Three examples of clean shots, taken between disguise sets.
At the end of the session, subjects removed their lab coat and left the semicircle of
cameras. Subjects were compensated monetarily for their time, and were given the baseball
hat, domino mask, and mustache to keep. They were also encouraged to return for a second
compensated session at least 30 days in the future.
Sessions were scheduled to last 45 minutes, although most took approximately 30 to 35
minutes. At the end of a single capture session, 875 images had been taken of the subject,
with each of the five cameras having taken 175 images. Each camera captured five images
of each of the 35 configuration: 28 disguises (including 12 that were combinations), six
clean images, and one image of the subject in their street clothes.
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5.5 Second Session
Subjects were encouraged to attend a second disguise capture session, which was largely
identical to the first. The primary difference was the omission of the consent and demo-
graphic forms during the second session, and the optional Kinect capture portion, discussed
in Section 5.6.1. Images of the subject blinking may also have been captured during the
second session, as discussed in Section 5.6.2.
The second session was a minimum of 30 days after the initial capture session. The
average number of days that passed between two sessions was 85.6, with the minimum
being 32 and a maximum of 162; the median was 72 days between sessions. Due to the
length of time that passed between sessions, subjects were again told what to expect during
a capture session. Of the 325 subjects who participated in the first session, 245 returned for
the second session, giving a total of 570 capture sessions.
5.6 Additional Data
In addition to the disguise images captured during each session, some of the sessions were
used to gather additional data, as described below. We hope that this additional data will
also be of use to other researchers.
5.6.1 Kinect Images
When contacted to come sit for their second session, subjects were given a brief explanation
of the Kinect portion, and were asked to opt in if they so desired. The Kinect portion
captured images of the subject in both 2D and 3D, and took only a few minutes to complete.
Many subjects declined, but 159 subjects agreed to participate in the Kinect portion of the
second session.
After the disguised images portion of the second session, subjects removed their lab
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coats, and were asked to sit back down in the chair. The two 500-Watt umbrella lights were
turned off, and the room’s overhead lights were used for capture. The Kinect’s 3D sensor
could not handle the intense output of the 500-Watt lights.
The Kinect was mounted on a specially-designed apparatus that kept it out of the way
during photo sessions. Once the subject was seated for the Kinect portion, the apparatus
was swung into position. The Kinect was mounted at a height of approximately 30 inches
and positioned approximately 24 inches away from the subject’s face. For most subjects,
this height was at about chest level, and the Kinect was positioned about 15 degrees to their
right.
The subject was asked to look directly at the Kinect, turning their head to point di-
rectly at it, or “head on”. Using screen capture on the computer connected to the Kinect,
a minimum of six images were captured in quick succession. Three pairs of 2D (color)
and 3D (depth map) images were captured, with each 2D/3D pair captured simultaneously.
For subjects who normally wore glasses, images were taken both with and without their
glasses, as seen in Figure 5.19.
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Figure 5.19: Images from a Kinect capture session.
5.6.2 Blinking Images
Initially, images of subjects blinking were deliberately excluded from the database. The
subject was observed during image capture, and images were retaken when blinking, talk-
ing, or moving occurred.
However, midway through the capture of the database, we identified that there was a
distinct lack of research on how blinking affects face recognition. This included a lack of
databases for testing purposes. For this reason, we added a small blinking component at
the end of each session past this point. A total of 188 blinking sessions were taken, with
two subjects participating during both of their sessions, for a total of 186 subjects captured
blinking.
Blinking images were taken directly following the disguise capture portion, with the
subject still wearing their lab coat, and with the use of the two 500-Watt umbrella lights.
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Subjects were captured blinking in two separate ways. First, we asked the subject to sim-
ulate a blink by closing their eyes, and took shots of this “simulated” blink with all five
cameras, as seen in Figure 5.20.
Figure 5.20: “Simulated” blinking image captures from each camera.
Next, we asked the subject to blink slowly. Specifically, to attempt to slow their blinking
motion (rather than long pauses between blinks). During this second part, we hoped to
catch not only “genuine” blinks, but also in-between stages where a subject’s eyes were
only partially open. A series of genuine blink captures can be seen in Figure 5.21.
Figure 5.21: A capture series of slow blinking motions; from top to bottom, left to right.
We took anywhere from 5 to 15 seconds of continuous shots of this blinking motion
with camera c3 (the “head on” camera). The time of capture varied, as we attempted to
capture either ten complete blinking motions or, if the subject was blinking rapidly, to
capture additional images with the intent of catching a sufficient number of in-between
images. Across the 188 blinking sessions, an average of 28 “genuine” blinking images
were captured per session.
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5.6.3 Disguise-Only Dummy Images
After all subject sessions were completed, one more disguise capture session was con-
ducted. This final session used a CPR dummy, and images were captured of the entire set
of disguises and disguise combinations. All five cameras were used to capture each dis-
guise, providing multiple views of the disguises. The intent was to produce a “subjectless”
image of each disguise without the irregularities of a human face.
The dummy images are more easily edited to remove the “subject,” leaving only the
disguise, which still follows the curves of an average human face. These disguise-only
images would have many possible uses, including using them to add disguises to images
in post-processing. The post-processed images could be used to artificially expand the size
of the database, or disguises could be added to probe images to improve the match score
against a disguised gallery image.
Figure 5.22: The CPR dummy used to model “subjectless” images of the disguises.
The dummy used was a Little Anne manikin made by Laerdal for CPR instructional
purposes, and can be seen in Figure 5.22. A disguise session was captured, although in a
slightly modified order to prevent unnecessary removal of disguises. Additionally, all three
variations of the surgical face mask (Figure 5.8) and all three variations of the mustache
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(Figure 5.7) were included in every disguise combination. Examples of the “subjectless”
dummy images can be seen in Section 5.2, where individual disguises are discussed.
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Chapter 6
The DISGUISED FACE DATABASE
This chapter presents details about the images that comprise the DISGUISED FACE
DATABASE, including the additional images discussed in Sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2. We
also discuss the diversity of the subject population, which was one of the main goals in
recruiting subjects for the database. Finally, we examine some of the unexpected chal-
lenges met during capture and analysis, and review the measures taken to overcome them
or counteract their effects.
6.1 Captured Images
The DISGUISED FACE DATABASE contains nearly 500,000 high-quality images of 325
individuals captured over 570 sessions. Table 6.1 provides more detail regarding the exact
breakdown per session and subject, as well as the disk space required for storage of the full
database.
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Total Subject Count 325
Second Sessions Completed 245
Total Session Count 570
Disguises1 per Session 35
Camera Angles per Disguise 5
Total Images per Disguise 25
Total Images per Session 875
Total Images in Full Database 498,750
Total Full Database Size 1717.5 GB
Total Images in Released Database 99,750
Total Released Database Size 343.5 GB
Table 6.1: A breakdown of the data included in the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE.
As can be seen in Table 6.1, the full DFACED requires nearly 2 Terabytes of disk space.
As discussed in Section 5.1.3, this includes five consecutive shots from each camera for
each pose. Figure 6.1 shows one set of consecutive shots, each captured within a fraction
of a second from the last. The top row depicts the images themselves, while the bottom row
highlights the nearly imperceptible differences between each consecutive pair of images.2
Figure 6.1: Consecutive shots from a capture session; difference between each image pair.
1Disguises includes both disguised and non-disguised images of the subject, as catalogued in Appendix A.
2The differences were rendered using MATLAB’s “absolute difference of two images” (imabsdiff)
function, and the contrast was artificially boosted in order to highlight the results.
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Despite the significant increase in storage space, the utility of the database is only neg-
ligibly increased by the addition of near-identical duplicate images. For this reason, the
database releasedd to other researchers will only include the first captured image in each
set of consecutive shots.
In addition to the images from a typical capture session, the database release to other
researchers will also include the additional Kinect and blinking data. Table 6.2 presents
the specifics of the data included, and the capture processes are discussed in detail in Sec-
tion 5.6. In total, including the additional data, along with the “subjectless” data (also
discussed in Section 5.6), the released DFACED totals 380 Gigabytes.
Parameter Kinect data Blinking data
Number of Sessions 159 188
Individual Subjects 159 186
Images Captured 1,306 9,915
Total Storage Required 1,345.7 MB 34,800 MB
Average Storage per Subject 8.5 MB 185 MB
Average Images per Subject 8 53
(Genuine Blinks Only) – 28
Table 6.2: Specifics of the additional Kinect and blinking data.
6.1.1 Post-Processing
A small amount of post-processing was also done on the images; specifically, a large
amount of pixels were cropped around the borders of the image. The data lost was of
the white background sheet, and the subject’s body below the chest area; an example can
be seen in Figure 6.2. Original captures had dimensions of 5184 x 3456 pixels; the final
cropped images available in DFACED are 3181 x 2456 pixels. Images were not resized
or scaled, however, and the interpupillary distance of the final images is in excess of 250
pixels.
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Figure 6.2: An example of a cropped image. The black border surrounding the image
depicts the boundaries of the original capture.
6.2 Subject Diversity
As stated previously, subject diversity was a main goal in gathering the DISGUISED FACE
DATABASE, and underrepresented populations were specifically targeted to ensure their
equal inclusion in the database. Information regarding race, gender, and age were supplied
by the subjects themselves to ensure accuracy, along with information describing their
individual ethnicity.
The race options provided were Black (or African American), East Asian (e.g., Chinese,
Japanese, Korean, etc.), South Asian (e.g., Indian, etc.), White (Caucasian), and Other.
The “Other” race option was used when subjects did not belong to one of the available
racial groups, and included subjects who identified as Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian,
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and multiracial.
Demographic Group # of Subjects Percent of Total
Gender
Female 174 53.5%
Male 151 46.5%
Race
White/Caucasian 177 54.4%
East Asian 59 18.2%
South Asian/Indian 38 11.7%
Black/African American 31 9.5%
Other 20 6.2%
Age Range
18 - 21 years old 89 27.4%
22 - 25 years old 112 34.4%
26 - 29 years old 53 16.3%
30 - 39 years old 34 10.5%
40 - 59 years old 28 8.6%
60 years and older 9 2.8%
Table 6.3: Gender, race, and age range demographics of the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE.
Despite our best attempts, the age distribution in DFACED skews significantly younger
than the general population. Of the subjects, 78% were between the ages of 18 and 30 at
the time of capture, with over a third of those aged 21 or younger. We believe this to be a
direct consequence of drawing subjects from the available population at the University of
Pennsylvania. However, there are a not insignificant number of subjects available for study
who were 30 years or older at the time of capture.
6.3 Unexpected Challenges
While the capture of the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE mostly ran smoothly, some chal-
lenges did occur, both during and after capture. In this section, we describe the challenges
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we encountered, and our approach to solving them. We hope that these experiences may
be useful to other researchers planning to conduct similar data gathering.
6.3.1 Subject Alignment
The first challenge was ensuring the subjects remained aligned with the cameras throughout
the session. At the beginning of the session, subjects were asked to sit up straight while
the cameras were adjusted to their height. Maintaining this position throughout the session
would also ensure that the subject remained horizontally aligned with the cameras.
Unfortunately, a vast majority of the subjects slouched as the session progressed, which
moved their head lower and further back from its initial position. An example of this
problem manifesting is shown in Figure 6.3; notice how the change in posture allows the
body of camera c5 to be visible.
Figure 6.3: A subject slouching during a session.
After this issue was discovered, subjects were instead directed to sit as was most com-
fortable for them during the initial setup. The chair was manually adjusted forwards or
backwards (toward or away from c3, the “head on” camera) as necessary to correctly align
the subject’s head. Once correct alignment had been achieved, the cameras’ heights were
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adjusted as well. Accommodating subjects in this way meant that subjects’ images were
more often correctly framed, and that their distance from each camera was more consistent.
In addition to the problem of subjects slouching as the session progressed, there was
also a minor problem with subjects moving their head between shots. Subjects moved their
head backwards and forwards, as well as tilting them up and down (i.e., the axis commonly
referred to as “pitch”).
Although subjects were monitored for this movement and corrected when needed,
anomalies did occasionally make it into the database. It is most common on images con-
taining the domino mask, as some subjects tilted their head in order to see out of the eye
holes, rather than adjusting the mask up or down.
6.3.2 Camera Focus
We initially left each camera in auto-focus mode in anticipation of subject position chang-
ing slightly (e.g., the aforementioned minor shifting of the head), This allowed each camera
to focus for each individual image capture. However, as we processed the images from the
initial round of subjects, we noticed that it was not uncommon for a camera to have taken
out-of-focus images for a single disguise. Once we became aware of the problem, it was
addressed by adjusting the depth of field. This modification meant that the camera only
needed to be focused once, at the beginning of each session.
The specifics of the modification can be seen in Table 6.4, which gives a summary of the
significant camera settings. These settings allowed the cameras to selected the appropriate
shutter speed for each image capture, hence the variable exposure time.
Once these settings were employed, camera focus was checked at the beginning of each
session. Specifically, each camera was switched to its original autofocus mode, and a set
of images was shot. The images were then examined to ensure they were in focus; if they
were, the camera was switched to manual mode. If not, autofocus mode was tried again;
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failing that, we manually adjusted the camera’s focus. After all of the cameras were in
focus and set to manual mode, they were used for the subject’s session.
Parameter Value
Exposure Program Aperture Priority
Exposure Time variable
Aperture Value 4.38 EV (f/4.6)
ISO Speed Rating 400
Recording Quality Large JPEG
Resolution 5184 x 3456
Color Space sRGB
Drive Mode Continuous
Metering Mode Pattern
Flash Off
Table 6.4: Camera settings used to prevent out-of-focus images.
6.3.3 Adjusting Disguises
For various reasons, four of the disguise components were difficult to apply uniformly to
each subject. Although care was taken to ensure consistency of disguise application, the
adhesive eyepatch, the baseball hat, the domino mask, and the mustache were repeatedly
problematic. In the end, it was necessary to take each individual subject’s interaction with
the disguise into account, as described below.
Eyepatch
Due to differences in skull shape, eyebrow size, and eyebrow placement between subjects,
eyepatches were difficult to consistently place. Instead, we prioritized coverage of the rele-
vant features over the exact placement location on the subject’s face. That is, we determined
it was more important to completely disguise each subject’s features, rather than to have all
subjects be identically (and possibly poorly) disguised.
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Baseball Hat
The baseball hats were billed as “one size fits most,” and though they fit all of our subjects,
the quality of that fit ranged widely. Subjects with larger craniums often had trouble wear-
ing the hat comfortably on their head, and needed to wear the hat tilted further forward or
backward than we preferred. Subjects with smaller craniums often had trouble adjusting
the velcro closure to be small enough; it was not uncommon for the hat to jut out from the
sides of the head. Additionally, a few subjects possessed especially voluminous hair, or
wore larger hairstyles, and hence could not place the hat firmly over their heads.
The CPR dummy used for the “subjectless” images has by design a cranium that is
smaller than average. The baseball hat jutting out from the sides of the head can be clearly
seen in Figure 5.6 in Chapter 5. For the sake of convenience, the figure has also been
reproduced below.
Figure 6.4: The baseball hat used in the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE, worn both forwards
and backwards. (Figure reproduced.)
Although consistent placement of the baseball hat on the head would be ideal, assessing
exact placement would have in itself been difficult. Rather than focusing on exact place-
ment, we allowed some variation in how far forward or backward the hat sat, as well as
variation in the tilt of the brim. It was more important that the hat face directly forwards,
and not be too far down in front of the eyes, nor too high on the forehead, in order to prevent
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unnaturally heavy shadows on the subject’s face.
Domino Mask
The domino mask was the most difficult disguise to work with, thanks in large part to the
eye holes. Ideally, we wanted each subject to wear the mask such that both of their eyes
were clearly visible through the provided eye holes. However, due to the variety of the
human face, this task was impossible.
Some subjects’ eyes were further apart than the eye holes; others were closer together.
Still other subjects’ eyes were not horizontally aligned perpendicular to their nose. In other
words, for both eyes to be visible the mask would need to be worn slanted across the face;
this was not possible given the construction of the mask. In these difficult cases, we did
our best to ensure that at least one eye was fully visible, and that the remaining eye was as
visible as was possible.
These problems were exacerbated by the difficulty of giving adjustment instructions to
subjects. In order to obtain the best results, minute adjustments were necessary, and were
often difficult to convey (e.g., the meaning of “a tiny bit up” versus “a little bit up”).
The difficulty was further compounded by the necessity of checking each adjustment
through camera c3. The camera operator’s view was higher than the camera itself, and
hence the angle of view “into” the eye holes was noticeably different. Due to this, the
adjustment of the domino mask had to be checked by taking a picture with camera c3 and
zooming in to examine the resulting photo.
Regardless of these difficulties, we believe that the resulting images containing the
domino mask are satisfactory. At a minimum, they are indicative of the difficulty of recog-
nition through a disguise like the domino mask.
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Mustache
For most subjects, the adhesive mustache was only a difficult disguise in that smiling or
talking while wearing it during a session was discouraged. However, for the small subset
of subjects who had facial hair, the mustache was a troublesome disguise.
For these subjects, the mustache was required to be placed over their facial hair, al-
though the disguise was meant to be placed directly on skin. Where possible, the mustache
was stuck to the skin surrounding the subject’s facial hair as well, which significantly im-
proved the adhesiveness.
We determined that it was more important for the mustache to stay straight, and less
important for it to remain tightly adhered to the face. (For some subjects, the mustache
ended up “hovering” a centimeter or so off the subject’s face, attached only to their facial
hair. It was also sometimes necessary to have the subject press the mustache back down
between shots to prevent it from coming off entirely.)
6.3.4 Issues with Images
Finally, we also encountered minor issues with the captured images that needed to be ad-
dressed before they could be used for recognition. Many of the images were initially being
rejected by our commercial recognizer for bad “dynamic range,” or the number of distinct
intensity values. In other words, the images lacked true blacks and whites, which made it
difficult for the recognizer to detect the face in the image.
One option was to lower the quality threshold for processing an image, essentially
forcing the recognizer to accept the image. However, by performing tests with manu-
ally adjusted images, we determined that improving the images’ dynamic range with post-
processing not only eliminated the problem of rejection, but also increased accuracy.
Initial trials were conducted using several different image-editing softwares, includ-
ing MATLAB, Adobe Photoshop, Adobe Lightroom, and Microsoft Picture Manager. We
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chose to use Adobe Lightroom, partly due to our need to process nearly 20,000 images
(from camera c3) with minimal oversight. Using the Autotone setting, we produced im-
ages with significantly improved dynamic range and quality.
Examples of some of the results can be seen in Figure 6.5. The center of the top row
contains the original image as it was captured by the camera. To the left is the image pro-
duced by Adobe Lightroom’s Autotone feature, which significantly improved the bright-
ness and contrast of the image, while retaining the black tones already present. To the right
is the image automatically produced by Microsoft Picture Manager, which unnaturally al-
tered the subject’s skin tone and exaggerated the contrast.
The bottom row contains two images produced by MATLAB. MATLAB has difficulty
performing automatic adjustments to color images, necessitating that we convert the images
to black and white (left) before performing automatic adjustment (right). Although the
MATLAB adjusted images were of fine quality, the loss of information due to the black and
white transformation lowered the recognition accuracy when compared to the performance
of images produced by Lightroom.
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Figure 6.5: The original captured image (top, center) compared to adjustments produced
by Adobe Lightroom, Microsoft Picture Manager, and MATLAB.
We may make these adjusted images available to other researchers along with the rest of
the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE. The images were more tightly cropped prior to adjust-
ment, and only encompass the first image (of each consecutive set) from camera c3. This
makes the set much smaller than the full DISGUISED FACE DATABASE; there are 19,911
images in the adjusted set, totaling only 20.7 Gigabytes.
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Chapter 7
Evaluation of Disguise Imagery
Evaluation of the data in the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE was performed using both com-
mercial and academic algorithms. In this section, we discuss the details of each evaluation,
including how training was performed, how the data was pre-processed, and how the re-
sults were collated and organized. In Chapter 8, we analyze the results of these evaluations
along a number of axes, and present possible causes of the observed patterns.
7.1 Commercial Off-the-Shelf Recognition Technology
To test against state-of-the-art technology, we employed the use of a commercially de-
veloped, publicly available recognition software. Another term for this is “Commercial
Off-the-Shelf” technology, or COTS technology. In this section, we discuss the acquisition
of the COTS technology we used, along with the details of the face recognition process for
this particular COTS FR system.
7.1.1 Acquiring Software
When choosing COTS software, we looked to the 2013 FRVT Evaluation [67], and those
companies whose software had performed well. We reached out to over half a dozen com-
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mercial companies with highly-rated COTS systems, hoping to acquire a wide range of FR
systems on which to test. However, although we were in discussions with a number of
them, only one vendor would offer access with minimal publication restrictions. One of
these restrictions is that the company and software cannot be named; however, as stated,
this software performed well in the 2013 FRVT Evaluations, and we believe it to be repre-
sentative of contemporary FR capabilities.
In addition, the COTS software we acquired is a black box, which unfortunately means
we have little knowledge of its internal workings. Furthermore, as the software is meant to
be a commercial solution for businesses, there is no available method for additional training
of the software prior to testing.
7.1.2 Preparing the Data
Initially, the COTS recognizer rejected many of the raw DFACED images because they
lacked “dynamic range” (i.e., they had a low number of distinct intensity values). As dis-
cussed in Section 6.3.4, we used Adobe Lightroom to adjust and improve the dynamic
range and the quality of the images, which eliminated the problem.
Ideally, images used for face recognition are aligned, a process in which the face is ro-
tated and centered, before being cropped to remove superfluous data. Automatic alignment
methods rely on detection of the eyes or other facial landmarks. By design, in many of the
DFACED images, these features are hidden (e.g., sunglasses) or are difficult to detect (e.g.,
the domino mask, which removes contextual data surrounding the eyes).
We briefly considered manual marking of the facial features, but with over 20,000 im-
ages, the task would have been highly labor-intensive. The difficulty of manual feature
marking was made more difficult because over a quarter of the images contain eyes that are
wholly occluded. Not only would manual marking have been difficult, the results produced
would likely have been inaccurate.
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7.1.3 Face Detection
After preparing the data, the COTS FR system was used to perform face detection and tem-
plate creation on each image from the 325 subjects’ first session. A face was successfully
detected in 70.6% of the available images, and hence templates were successfully generated
for those images. Images with low disguise coverage (e.g., mustache, eyebrows, baseball
hat) or none at all (“Clean” and “As Arrived”) had very high rates of face detection, over
99%.
Failure to detect a face was more common on images with a high amount of disguise
coverage, some examples of which can be seen in Figure 7.1. For example, “H-S-FM”
(Hat-Sunglasses-Face Mask) images were never successfully detected as containing a face.
Likewise, “S-FM” images had successful face detection for only 1.2% of the subjects, and
“H-DM-FM” (Hat-Domino Mask-Face Mask) for only 1.7% of subjects.
Figure 7.1: Disguises for which the COTS system face detection largely failed.
7.1.4 Face Recognition
Using the generated templates, the COTS FR system was used to run an identification
(1:many) test on every image, in the form of verification (1:1) tests against every other
image in the database. In other words, we generated a similarity matrix of size 11,335 x
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11,335 (the number of images from the subjects’ first session1), where each element in the
matrix contains the match score between two images.
The COTS system we used employs a “matching threshold” to control the False Accep-
tance Rate (FAR), and returns all results for which its confidence is above the threshold.
The FAR was set to be .01%, although the actual FAR generated was somewhat higher at
0.4%. This is to be expected given the noise deliberately introduced through the disguises.
For comparison, we looked at the results of each subject’s “AA” (As Arrived) image
verified against each of their clean images, and both FAR and FRR were 0%. The only
exceptions were two subjects whose “AA” image had failed to generate a template; both
had occlusions due to hair in their “AA” image, preventing initial face detection.
From the results, we calculated the percentage of successful matches against the sub-
ject’s clean images for each disguise tested. For example, as seen in Figure 7.2, a disguised
image that is correctly matched to five of the subject’s six clean images produces a correct
match percentage (CMP) of 83.3%. Calculating the CMP gives results with more grada-
tion than a binary “good disguise” versus “bad disguise”, although results were most often
100% or 0%.
Figure 7.2: An example of correct match percentage calculation, with a result of 83.3%.
In the case of disguises where a face was not detected, and a template was not gen-
1As mentioned in Section 5.4.2, the “H-DM-FM” (Hat-Domino Mask-Face Mask) disguise was not cap-
tured for the first 32 sessions. Additionally, eight clean images were not captured by mistake during some of
the first sessions. This decreases the total number of images below the expected 11,375.
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erated, the CMP was 0%. Rather than discount entirely those disguises in which a user’s
face is undetectable, much less recognizable, these disguises are deemed 100% effective.
Ultimately, without a discernible face, the image cannot be successfully matched to any of
the subject’s clean images, causing it to be a “perfect” disguise.
7.1.5 Results
In discussing results, it is important to note that the relationship between correct match
percentage (CMP) and disguise effectiveness is inversely correlated: the higher the match
percentage, the more poorly the disguise performed. In other words, disguises with low
correct match percentages are more effective at disguising the wearer – they prevent the FR
system from making a correct identification. For clarity, we will be referring exclusively
to the disguise’s effectiveness from this point on, which we calculate as the percentage
1− CMP .
To begin, disguises were sorted from best performance to worst based on their disguise
effectiveness, as averaged across all of the 325 subjects. The results can be seen in Fig-
ure 7.3, and are discussed in Chapter 8. Following this, we grouped subjects’ results by
race and gender, and by skin tone. Discussion of these grouped results can be found in
Sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2.
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Figure 7.3: Effectiveness of disguises against COTS system, across entire subject pool.
Another interesting result, which we will discuss further in Section 8.4, is Intra-
Disguise MisClassification, or IDMC. IDMC is the tendency for a disguised subject to be
incorrectly identified as a second subject who is wearing the same (or a similar) disguise.
For example, if Subject A is wearing a domino mask, the FR algorithm may incorrectly
identify him as Subject B while she is wearing a domino mask, and as Subject C while
he is wearing a domino mask and baseball hat. Figure 7.4 shows the percentage of the
subjects affected by IDMC for each disguise. (Specifically, the percentage is taken only
from subjects whose faces were detected by the COTS face recognition system; for this
reason, “H-S-FM” is not included.)
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Figure 7.4: Subjects affected by IDMC with the COTS system, for each disguise.
7.2 Academic Face Recognition Methods
Originally, we had intended to perform extensive testing using a diverse set of cutting-edge
face recognition algorithms that were specifically designed to handle the challenges posed
by occlusion. We contacted numerous researchers, but were unable to obtain implemen-
tations of algorithms described in papers that were necessary for this testing. It was not
feasible to replicate implementations of these algorithms, as the design and development
of sophisticated FR algorithms is outside the scope of this dissertation.
As it is open-source, we were able to perform tests using the OpenBR testing frame-
work, which supports the community development of algorithms and reproducible re-
sults [87]. Specifically, we performed testing using the Spectrally Sampled Structural Sub-
space Features (4SF) algorithm, which is provided as part of the OpenBR framework [84].
“OpenBR’s implementation of 4SF yields accuracies comparable to some commercial face
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recognition systems [and is] representative of modern face recognition algorithms in its use
of face representations and feature extraction.” [87]
7.2.1 Spectrally Sampled Structural Subspace Features algorithm
The Spectrally Sampled Structural Subspace Features algorithm, abbreviated as 4SF, in-
corporates both PCA, LDA, and LBP. The algorithm first uses automatically detected eye
coordinates to normalize the face geometrically, before performing illumination correction.
After being broken into densely sampled patches, LBP histograms are used to represent the
face. PCA is performed on each face patch, with 98.0% of the variance retained.
A training set is provided and used to perform multiple stages of random sampling,
weighted by the eigenvalues; at each random sampling instance, LDA is performed on
the sampled components. The LDA subspaces themselves are learned using randomly
selected subjects from the training set. Finally, the LBP representation of the face images
is projected into the (per-patch) PCA subspaces, followed by projection into each of the
learned LDA subspaces. The Euclidean distance in each subspace is summed, with the
final result representing the dissimilarity between two face images [84].
7.2.2 Data Preparation and Training
For consistency, the DFACED images used in the 4SF tests were the same as those used for
the COTS testing, discussed in Section 7.1.2. The pre-processing that was done to improve
the quality of these images is explained in Section 6.3.4.
For training purposes, the 4SF algorithm was given subjects’ clean images, each labeled
with the subject’s number. This training emulated the information a typical FR system
would possess: multiple images of each subject, undisguised. The OpenBR commands
used to perform the training are included in Appendix B, along with the commands used
for enrollment and testing.
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7.2.3 Face Detection
After preparing the data, the 4SF algorithm was used to perform face detection and en-
rollment (template creation) on each image. For images with low disguise coverage, the
4SF algorithm performed similarly to the COTS system. The algorithm successfully de-
tected faces in 100% of the “Clean” images, and detected over 99% of the eyebrow (“EBl”,
“EBb”, and “EBr”), mustache (“M”), and hat (“H” and “Hb”) disguises.
However, the 4SF algorithm had a lower threshold for what constitutes a face, and de-
tected a face in 83.7% of the available images, significantly higher than the COTS system’s
70.6%. Further examination showed that many of the detected “faces” were erroneous
(e.g., wrinkles in the surgical face mask). For example, 4SF detected a face for 21.4%
of the subjects while wearing the “H-DM-FM” disguise, while the COTS system only de-
tected 1.7% of the subjects. We will discuss the phenomenon of false detections in more
detail in Section 8.5.
7.2.4 Face Recognition
The OpenBR framework also allowed us to generate a gallery containing all of the images
that contained detected faces, which we did. The OpenBR framework was used to run a
4SF identification (1:many) test on every image, against this generated gallery, generating
a similarity matrix.
Unlike the COTS system, the OpenBR framework and the 4SF algorithm were not able
to be calibrated to produce a specific FAR. Instead, results are returned for every compar-
ison, including ones where the similarity score was incredibly low (e.g., 2.63× 10−6), or
even zero. We chose to truncate the results at similarity scores of 50% or higher, as this
allowed the most informative comparison to the COTS system.
From these truncated similarity scores, results were calculated in the same manner as
was done for the COTS system. Specifically, we first calculated the percentage of success-
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ful matches against the subject’s clean images for each disguise tested, before using the
result to calculate the disguise effectiveness. (For more details, please see the discussion in
Section 7.1.5.)
7.2.5 Results
To begin, disguises were sorted from best performance to worst, based on their average dis-
guise effectiveness across all of the 325 subjects. The results can be seen in Figure 7.5, and
are discussed in further detail in Chapter 8. Following this, we grouped subjects’ results by
race and gender (discussed in Section 8.3.1) and by skin tone (discussed in Section 8.3.2).
The IDMC effect, previously discussed for the COTS system, will be covered for both face
recognition techniques in detail in Section 8.4.
Figure 7.5: Effectiveness of disguises against 4SF algorithm, across entire subject pool.
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Chapter 8
Analysis
In this chapter, we discuss in details the results of using both face recognition systems
against the DFACED images, in a variety of contexts. We first discuss the overall disguise
performance, including disparities between detection and recognition. We then move on to
examining the effect of disguises worn in combination on face recognition effectiveness.
In the following section, we examine differences in results between demographic groups,
using both the race and gender information provided by the subjects, as well as differences
in skin tone, as determined using the method outline in Section 8.3.2. The phenomenon
of Intra-Disguise MisClassification (IDMC), a possible alternative mechanism for effective
disguisal, is examined as well. Finally, we conclude by offering multiple hypothetical
models for the results presented.
Before we examine the data in detail, we would like to take a moment to emphasize
that the results presented here apply only to the specific COTS technology upon which we
tested. It is only one of the many COTS systems that performed well in the 2013 FRVT
Evaluation [67]. Although we attempt to draw general conclusions from the data, it is
possible that testing with alternative commercial face recognition systems could produce
entirely different results. In fact, due to the unusual nature of the data of the DISGUISED
FACE DATABASE, it is likely that different COTS systems would provide divergent results.
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8.1 Overall Disguise Performance
We will begin by examining the performance of the disguises generally, averaged over
the entire set of 325 subjects. We present the effectiveness of the 28 DFACED disguises,
as measured against the Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) technology in Figure 8.1 (re-
producing Figure 7.3 from the previous chapter for convenience). From the data, we can
clearly see that disguises with multiple components, which also offer high coverage, are the
most effective against the COTS system. Conversely, disguises that offer little coverage,
such as the baseball hat and eyebrow coverings, are ineffective as a disguise. The mus-
tache disguise is also ineffective, despite its not insignificant coverage; however, it is to be
expected that a COTS FR system would be capable of handling normal changes in facial
hair.
Figure 8.1: Effectiveness of disguises against COTS system, across entire subject pool.
(Figure reproduced.)
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We next examine the disguise effectiveness as measured against the 4SF algorithm in
Figure 8.2 (again, reproducing Figure 7.5). Against the 4SF algorithm, although there
are distinct differences in the extent of the disguise effectiveness, we can observe similar
patterns. Again, we note the effectiveness of disguises with higher coverage and/or multiple
disguise components. And similarly, we can observe that the disguises that offer scant
coverage (the baseball hat and eyebrow coverings), are only minimally effective against
the algorithm. One result of note is the increase in the effectiveness of the mustache,
which is 13% more effective against the 4SF algorithm. However, if the 4SF algorithm
was sufficiently trained on images containing more variations in facial hair, the mustache’s
effectiveness as a disguise would likely drop.
Figure 8.2: Effectiveness of disguises against 4SF algorithm, across entire subject pool.
(Figure reproduced.)
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Finally, we present Figure 8.3, in which we directly compare the two algorithms, as
measured by disguise effectiveness. The graph has been sorted based on the disguise effec-
tiveness as assessed against the COTS system. It is immediately clear that a number of the
disguises that are only moderately or even minimally effective against the COTS system
are incredibly effective when measured against the 4SF algorithm. In particular, many of
the combination disguises, as well as the sunglasses alone, are much more effective against
the 4SF algorithm. However, we can still observe that, in general, as disguise coverage
decreases the effectiveness of the disguise falls.
Figure 8.3: Comparison between COTS system and 4SF algorithm of disguise effective-
ness.
Against the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE, the COTS system is the more capable FR
algorithm, in comparison to 4SF as implemented by OpenBR. In other words, disguises are
less “effective” when pitted against the COTS system.
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8.2 Combination Disguise Effectiveness
We have just observed that higher coverage of the face generally leads to an increase in
disguise effectiveness. We will now examine this phenomenon in the context of the interac-
tions between disguise component combinations. In Figure 8.4, we present a Venn diagram
that shows the overlap between three sets of disguises, as measured against the COTS sys-
tem. The domino mask and sunglasses, which cover the ocular region, are shown on the
top and bottom; the face mask and mustache, which cover the perioral region, are shown
on the left and right; and the baseball hat, which covers the skullcap, is shown in the center
circle.1
Figure 8.4: A Venn diagram illustrating disguise effectiveness, as measured against the
COTS FR system, for five disguises and their combinations.
1 The sunglasses and face mask results shown are for “Sbd,” sunglasses with black frames and dark
lenses; and “FM1,” face mask that covers the nose and chin. The “H-DM-M” disguise was not captured in
the database.
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We can observe that a combination of disguises often performs far better than either
of the disguise components alone, or even the sum of the two disguises. For example, the
hat and mustache have negligible disguise effectiveness when used alone (0.3% and 0.5%,
respectively). In combination, however, the two disguises achieve a disguise effectiveness
of 5.2%; while still low, it is clearly a viable disguise for a small subset of subjects. Exam-
ining the raw data, for the majority of subjects for whom “H-M” is 100% effective, each
disguise alone was entirely ineffective; only through combination could the components
work as a disguise for even that small subset of subjects.
Another example can be seen in the “DM-FM” disguise, a combination of the domino
and face masks. Alone, each disguise component covers a large portion of the face, al-
though not enough to prevent recognition for a majority of subjects. In combination, how-
ever, the two disguises hide the bulk of the features, making the combined disguise 100%
effective.
This substantial increase in effectiveness is consistently observable in every disguise
combination. Even the poorly-performing hat and mustache disguise components, when
used in combination with another disguise, double the disguise’s effectiveness. The effect is
even more pronounced in combinations that use three disguise components; in these cases,
the disguise combination often performs perfectly, with 100% disguise effectiveness.
In Figure 8.5, we present a similar Venn diagram that shows the same disguises and
their overlaps, but measured in effectiveness against the 4SF algorithm, as implemented by
OpenBR. Although the effect is not quite as clear, due to the overall increase in disguise
effectiveness against 4SF, the same trends can be observed. Again, the hat and mustache
disguises, relatively ineffective on their own (4.1% and 14.2%, respectively), are effective
for nearly half of the subjects when used in combination. We can also observe a simi-
lar effect for the combination of the hat (4.1% disguise effectiveness) and the face mask
(53.4%): the resulting “H-FM” disguise combination has a disguise effectiveness of 94%.
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Figure 8.5: A Venn diagram illustrating disguise effectiveness, as measured against the 4SF
algorithm, for five disguises and their combinations.
To those looking to disguise themselves surreptitiously, this interaction between sep-
arate disguise components has possible applications. For example, two understated dis-
guises, which are ineffective on their own (e.g., a mustache and glasses), can be combined
into a disguise that remains understated while improving the effectiveness against face
recognition. Although the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE does not contain images where
the mustache is combined with the clear-lensed sunglasses disguises (“Sbc” and “Swc”),
it may be possible to artificially create such a disguise, and perform tests measuring the
effectiveness of it and similar artifical disguises, as we will discuss in Section 9.4.1.
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8.3 Performance Between Demographics
Having investigated the performance differences of the disguises both generally and in
combination with each other, we now turn our attention to comparing disguise performance
between different subject groupings. We will examine the subject pool as separate groups,
based on their demographics. First, we will use the race and gender information provided
by the subjects during data capture. We will observe distinct differences in disguise perfor-
mance between the racial groups, most notably between those subjects who self-identified
their race as White and those who self-identified as Black. Following this, we will break
subjects into groups based on their skin tone, to more precisely examine the differences in
disguise effectiveness based on skin tone.
8.3.1 Grouped by Race and Gender
As discussed previously in Section 6.2, the subjects of the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE
are demographically diverse. The race options subjects chose from were as follows: Black
(or African American), East Asian (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, Korean, etc.), South Asian
(e.g., Indian, etc.), White (Caucasian), and Other. The “Other” race option was used when
subjects did not belong to one of the available racial groups. This group included subjects
who identified as Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian, and multiracial. Due to the small size
(20 subjects) of the “Other” racial group, as well as its inconsistent ethnic makeup, those
subjects who identified as “Other” were excluded from this portion of the analysis.
For the sake of brevity, and due to the large number of groups being examined, we have
excluded from this analysis those disguises with high disguise effectiveness (greater than
99%), and those with very low disguise effectiveness (less than 2%).2 We then grouped
2 For the COTS system, we removed “DM-FM,” “H-DM-FM,” “H-S-FM,” and “S-FM” due to their high
effectiveness; “M,” “EBr,” “H,” “EBl,” “EBb,” and “Hb” were also excluded due to low effectiveness. For
the 4SF algorithm, we excluded “DM-FM,” “H-DM-FM,” “S-FM,” “H-S-M,” “S-M,” “H-S,” “Swd,” “Sbd,”
“H-S-FM,” “DM-M,” “H-DM,” and “DM” due to high effectiveness; no disguises were removed for low
effectiveness.
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the subjects’ results by race and gender, and calculated each demographic group’s average
performance for each of the remaining disguises.
The COTS FR System
We first present the results as measured against the COTS system, seen in Table 8.1, broken
down by race/gender and disguise. In the table, the darker the shading of individual cells,
the more effective the disguise was for that demographic group. It is immediately clear that
when tested against this specific COTS system, there are differences in disguise effective-
ness between different demographic groups; we will further examine these differences in
an attempt to better understand the underlying causes.
First, we examine the effectiveness of the face mask disguises: “FM1,” where the mask
is worn fully covering the nose and chin; “FM2,” where the mask is pulled down to reveal
the nose; and “FM3,” where both the nose and chin are uncovered. Focusing on the “FM1”
disguise, we observe that disguise effectiveness is much higher for Black women and men
(76.2% and 58.3%, respectively) than for any other group. In comparison, “FM1” fails as
a disguise for White women and men, with low effectiveness rates of 20.5% and 13.5%.
We can also see a similar, though less pronounced, effect for the “FM2” and “FM3” dis-
guises; the effectiveness in these cases is not as markedly different between demographic
groups, but there is significant improvement for Black women and men. This effect is seen
again in the “EBb-FM” disguise: although it is over 55% effective for all of the demo-
graphic groups, it performs exceptionally well on Black women and men, with 99.2% and
100% effectiveness.
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In contrast, the “DM-M” disguise performs relatively well across all demographic
groups, but is a particularly effective disguise for White women and men (98.7% and
88.2%), and far less effective in disguising Black women and men (35.7% and 40%,
respectively). As another example, the “Sbd” disguise is somewhat effective for all de-
mographic groups, but its effectiveness is especially pronounced for White women and
men, at 53.8% and 39.9%, respectively. Similar increased disguise effectiveness for White
subjects can be seen in the results for the “Swd” and “DM” disguises.
Although these divergences in performance are most apparent when examining the
Black and White demographic groups, differences can also be seen for certain disguises
in the South Asian group, as well as between the two genders. For example, the “S-M”
disguise is overall an effective disguise, with the exception of its performance for South
Asian women and men. Additionally, within every racial group, the “H-S” disguise is less
effective when worn by men, decreasing in effectiveness by a minimum of 12%.
Finally, disguise effectiveness varies widely between subjects, including subjects be-
longing to the same demographic group, and even of the same age. As an example, for
subject 156, disguise effectiveness over all disguises is only 19.5%; in contrast, for subject
193 the overall disguise effectiveness is 46.4%, despite both subjects being demographi-
cally “identical.” This may be due to inherent disguisability, as discussed by Yager and
Dunstone [168], although it may also be caused by the imprecise demographic grouping of
“race.”
We hypothesize that many of these differences in performance are caused by differences
in the level of contrast between a disguise and the subject’s skin tone. Some researchers
have show that in addition to a decline in accuracy due to a disguise occluding the features,
recognition is further degraded by a disguise that is in high contrast with the surrounding
area of the face [6]. In Section 8.3.2, we will examine the question of contrast more closely
by dividing the subjects into demographic groups on the basis of skin tone. We will also
discuss this hypothesis in further detail in Section 8.6.2.
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The 4SF Algorithm
We now examine the performance of the 4SF algorithm, seen in Table 8.2, broken down
by race, gender, and disguise. Again, the darker the shading of individual cells, the more
effective the disguise was for that demographic group. As a reminder, we have excluded
the disguises with greater than 99% disguise effectiveness over the entirety of the subject
pool.
We again begin by examining the effectiveness of the face mask disguises. Although
“FM1” has been excluded due to high overall effectiveness, “FM2” and “FM3” both show
gradational differences in performance between demographic groups. Most clearly, “FM2,”
the face mask disguise worn such that the nose is uncovered, is a substantially more effec-
tive disguise for Black women and men, with 57.1% and 81.7% effectiveness, respectively.
The effect can also be seen for “FM3,” although it is less pronounced in comparison to the
other demographic groups. Interestingly, within each racial group, the “FM3” disguise is a
much more effective disguise for the men that it is for the women.
We can also observe that the “Er” disguise is more effective for Black women and men,
for whom it is a perfect disguise with 100% effectiveness. Again, however, we note that
the disguise is also markedly more effective for the men in each of the other racial groups.
Conversely, the “M” disguise performs poorly on the majority of the subject pool, but is
a somewhat effective disguise on White women and men (27.7% and 20.6%, respectively).
As discussed in Section 8.2, combining the mustache disguise with the baseball hat to
create the “H-M” disguise improves its performance, increasing its effectiveness for each
demographic group. The most marked improvement is for White women (68.8% disguise
effectiveness), and also to a certain extent for White men (39.3%).
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Again, we hypothesize that many of these differences in performance are due to the
level of contrast between the disguise and the skin tone of the subject. In the following
Section, we will more closely examine the performance of the subjects, as divided by their
skin tone, and in Section 8.6.2, we will discuss the possibility of contrast as an explanation
for disguise performance in more detail.
8.3.2 Grouped by Skin Tone
In addition to using the racial labels self-designated by each subject, we also present and
analyze the results organized by skin tone. This allows us to take into consideration intra-
demographic group variance, and provides greater granularity in the results. It also pro-
vides data for further examination of the contrast hypothesis, which we discuss in detail in
Section 8.6.2.
Computing Skin Tone Groups
Before using skin tone as a metric, it was necessary to exactly determine each subject’s
individual skin tone. First, we manually selected a 140 x 140 pixel area of each subject’s
face. The area chosen was the forehead, slightly off of center, but still avoiding hairlines
and eyebrows in the swatch. Although the cheek might have seemed an easier choice, many
male subjects had facial hair in that area, and the cheek area was also prone to highlights
created by the bright lighting.
Once a swatch had been created for every subject, GIMP (the GNU Image Manipulation
Program) was employed to compute an average skin tone. We used the color picker tool
(i.e., the eyedropper), and enabled its “Sample average” option. The radius for the tool
was set to the maximum of 300 pixels to ensure that no part of the swatch image would be
ignored. After obtaining the average color, the entirety of the swatch was converted to a
uniform sample of that color.
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This single-color swatch was then transformed to grayscale mode, the Value of the
resulting color noted, and this Value was drawn on the swatch for later reference.3 The
lower the Value, the darker the color, and hence the darker the subject’s skin tone. An
illustration of each step of the process can be seen in Figure 8.6.
(1) Forehead swatch (2) Average color (3) Image grayscaled (4) Value of swatch
Figure 8.6: The four step process of determining a subject’s average skin tone.
Once all of the subjects had been assigned a skin tone value, we counted the number of
instances of each value, and created a graph (seen in Figure 8.7) to aid in splitting subjects
into separate skin tone groups. Nine individual skin tone groups were created, using natural
“breaks” in the data to determine where splits occurred, while still keeping each group size
relatively small. These breaks can be seen in Figure 8.7, illustrated by alternating colors
for each subsequent group.
3 A color in grayscale has no Hue or Saturation, and its Red, Green, and Blue values are identical. The
RGB values also mirror the Value slider: e.g., a Value of 0 produces RGB values of 0, a Value of 50 produces
RGB values of 128, and a value of 100 produces RGB values of 255.
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Figure 8.7: A count of each skin tone value over the number of subjects; the alternating
colors represent separate skin tone groupings.
Swatch examples from each skin tone group can be seen in Figure 8.8, in which each
column shows three samples from the indicated group. Groups are numbered from 1 to 9,
with group 1 having the darkest skin tones, and group 9 having the lightest. Groups 1 and
9 are the smallest, with 17 and 16 subjects, respectively; the second lightest and darkest
(groups 2 and 8) contain 27 and 29 subjects; the middle (group 5) contains 62 subjects, and
the additional groups have around 45 subjects each. This unequal division makes logical
sense, as an average skin tone should be more common than a very light or dark skin tone.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Figure 8.8: The nine skin tone groups.
Skin Tone Results
Once subjects are grouped by skin tone, we can analyze the results along the axis of skin
tone (and hence the contrast of skin tone against a disguise), rather than by a subject’s
self-designated race.
The COTS FR System
We first present the results of disguise effectiveness, as measured against the COTS FR
system, shown in Figure C.5. (The figure is also available in color and as a line graph in
Appendix C.)
Although none of the disguises show an exact skin tone-based progression of effective-
ness, many of the disguises do exhibit a range of disguise effectiveness, based generally
around the spectrum of skin tones. For example, we can clearly see that “EBb-FM” is
significantly more effective on subjects with the two darkest skin tones. We can also see
that “FM1” is significantly more effective on subjects with the darkest skin tone, and is
also 100% ineffective for subjects with the lightest skin tone. A similar effect can also be
observed for the “H-FM,” “FM2,” and “FM3” disguises, although it is less pronounced.
Examining other disguises, we can observe the opposite effect, in which the disguise
is more effective for subjects with lighter skin tones. For example, the “DM-M,” “DM,”
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“Swd,” and “Sbd” disguises are not only significantly more effective for subjects with
lighter skin tones, they are also significantly less effective for subjects with darker skin
tones.
Finally, by dividing the subjects by skin tone, we can address some of the puzzling
results we previously observed in Section 8.3.1. First, the “S-M” disguise performed poorly
on South Asian women and men (28.6% and 39.6%, respectively), although it was an
effective disguise for every other demographic group (52.4% to 85.6% effectiveness). If we
consider the disguise’s effectiveness in the context of skin tone, however, we can observe a
clear increase in the disguise’s effectiveness as the subject’s skin tone lightens.
Secondly, we previously observed that within every racial group, the “H-S” disguise
was less effective for male subjects. However, if we examine this disguise’s performance
for each skin tone group, we can again see that the effectiveness of the disguise decreases
for subjects with darker skin tones. From this, we can conclude either that within each
racial group, men have overall darker skin tones than the women; or that men are over-
represented in the darker skin tone demographics.
In Appendix C, we have provided individual graphs for the results of each skin tone
group’s results against the COTS FR system. The graphs include error bars which represent
the confidence interval for each result. Where the results for a given disguise were either
0% or 100%, we have calculated the confidence interval using a method specifically for
“zero events” [136]. These graphs can be found as Figures C.7 through C.15.
The 4SF Algorithm
We next examine the disguise effectiveness (grouped by skin tone), as measured against the
4SF FR algorithm, shown in Figure C.6. (Again, the figure is also available in color and as
a line graph in Appendix C.)
Again, although none of the disguises exhibit a perfect light to dark skin tone-based
progression, we can clearly see that many of them exhibit a range of effectiveness that is
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loosely based on the skin tone spectrum. Many of the disguises are much more effective on
subjects with darker skin tones: “Swc,” “Er,” “FM1,” “FM3,” and “FM2”. “FM3” is also
the disguise for which we earlier noted a difference in performance between the genders
within each racial group, in which the disguise’s effectiveness was heightened for the men.
Examining “FM3” now, we can see a clear overall progression in effectiveness, with those
subjects with lighter skin tones not benefiting from the disguise, while those with darker
skin tones experience much higher disguise effectiveness. Conversely, we can also see
disguises whose effectiveness is higher for subjects with lighter skin tones: “H-M” and
“M” both fall into this category.
Analysis
For both the COTS FR system and the 4SF FR algorithm, we can observe a relatively
straightforward trend when examining disguise effectiveness for subjects grouped by skin
tone. For subjects with lighter skin tones, disguises with lighter colors (e.g., disguises
that incorporate the face mask as a major component, such as “FM1,” “FM2,” “FM3,” and
“EBb-FM”) are less effective at preventing recognition. And disguises with darker colors
(e.g., disguises that incorporate the sunglasses and domino mask) are more effective at
preventing recognition.
We can see the opposite for subjects with darker skin tones: disguises with darker colors
are less effective at preventing recognition, while those with lighter colors are more effec-
tive as a disguise. From this, we hypothesize that these differences in disguise effectiveness
are at least somewhat rooted in the level of contrast between the disguise and the skin tone
of the subject. We will expand upon this hypothesis in more detail in Section 8.6.2.
128
8.4 Intra-Disguise MisClassification
Intra-Disguise MisClassification (or IDMC) is the tendency for a disguised subject to be
incorrectly identified as a different subject who is wearing the same (or a similar) disguise.
We divide IDMCs into two categories: an “exact same disguise” match, and a “shared dis-
guise components” match. For example, if Subject A is wearing “DM-FM,” and the FR
algorithm incorrectly identifies them as Subject B wearing “DM-FM” that would be an
“exact same disguise” IDMC. If Subject A, again wearing “DM-FM,” is incorrectly identi-
fied as Subject C wearing “S-FM,” Subject D wearing “H-DM-FM” or Subject E wearing
“DM,” that would be a “shared disguise components” IDMC.4 For clarity, we present a full
list of the disguises that qualify as containing “shared components” in Table C.1, located
in Appendix C.
The COTS System
We will begin by discussing the percentage of subjects who are affected by IDMC for each
of the disguises. Specifically, we calculate the percentage of the subjects whose faces were
detected by the FR system shown; for this reason, “H-S-FM” is not included in the results
from the COTS system. In Figure 8.11, we show the percentage of subjects affected by
both exact and shared component IDMC matches, as seen in the results from the COTS
system.
4“Exact same disguise” IDMCs are also included in the “shared disguise components” count.
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Figure 8.11: Subjects affected by IDMC with the COTS system, for each disguise. (Figure
reproduced.)
To better explain, we present an example. As we will see later in Figure 8.17, 294
of the 325 subjects (or over 90%) who wore the “FM3” disguise had a “face” detected
by the COTS system. 293 of these subjects were correctly matched to their own clean
images, meaning that the “FM3” disguise was ineffective for most of the subjects, with a
disguise effectiveness of only 10% (which matches data previously seen in Figure 8.1). If
we examine Figure 8.11, we can see that out of these 294 subjects who had a face detected
while wearing the “FM3” disguise, 69% of them were incorrectly matched to at least one
other subject wearing the exact same disguise. In other words, despite the low effectiveness
of the “FM3” disguise, for 69% of the subjects, the COTS system mistakenly identified
them as at least one other subject wearing the same disguise.
Looking at the graph, we can see that for a majority of subjects, IDMC matches oc-
curred both against the exact disguise, as well as against a disguise containing a shared
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component. It is also observable that both the full coverage face mask (“FM1”) and the
sunglasses disguise components were involed in at least one IDMC for a majority of sub-
jects. The mustache disguise and the eyepatch disguises (“El,” “Er,” “EBb,” “EBl,” and
“EBr”) did not result in IDMCs for most of the subjects. Against the COTS system, these
disguises also had low effectiveness, which makes this result unsurprising; the COTS sys-
tem was not mislead by these disguises, and hence was less likely to incorrectly match
subjects wearing them against another subject. Finally, we can also observe that disguises
with many components were much more likely to cause at least one IDMC per subject.
In Figure 8.12, we present the percentage of incorrect matches that involved “exact
same” and “shared component” IDMC matches, as seen in the results from the COTS sys-
tem. For example, 42% of the incorrect matches for subjects wearing the mustache disguise
(“M”) involved the exact same disguise, while 69% of the incorrect matches involved the
mustache disguise combined with another disguise component. The remaining 31% of
matches were caused by incorrect matches against other subjects who were wearing either
another disguise (e.g., “EBr”) or against other subjects’ clean or “As Arrived” images.
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Figure 8.12: Percent of incorrect matches by the COTS system involving IDMC.
As another example, for the domino mask disguise (“DM”), 44% of all incorrect
matches were against another subject wearing the “exact same” disguise. However, if we
take into account all of the disguises that contain the “DM” disguise component, every
single incorrect match involved IDMC, in which the other subject was wearing the “DM”
disguise component (either alone or in conjunction with additional disguise components).
We also previously noted that multi-component disguises were much more likely to
result in at least one IDMC for subjects who wore them, for both exact and shared com-
ponent matches. However, in examining Figure 8.12, we can see that for multi-component
disguises, the number of incorrect matches caused by shared disguise components far out-
numbers those caused by exact disguises. This is likely caused, at least in part, by the
increased number of disguise components, which raises the number of possible disguises
with shared components.
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Finally, in Figure 8.13, we present the average number of IDMC matches per affected
subject for the COTS system. Again, we note the low number of IDMCs caused by the
mustache disguise and eyepatch disguises. However, the presence of a large number of
“exact same” IDMC matches for the “Swc” and “Swd” disguises are interesting, especially
in comparison to the low number for the corresponding “Sbc” and “Sbd” disguises. This
may be due to the COTS system having been more thoroughly trained on the more common
dark-framed glasses and sunglasses, and therefore being better able to handle differentiat-
ing between subjects wearing these items. We see a similar high average for the “DM,”
“H-DM,” “H-DM-FM,” and “DM-M” disguises. Again, this may be explained by a lack
of domino masks in the data the COTS system was trained on, which causes it to treat the
domino mask as a part of the subject’s face, rather than as a worn item.
Figure 8.13: Average number of IDMC matches per affected subject with the COTS system.
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The 4SF Algorithm
In Figure 8.14, we show the percentage of subjects affected by both exact and shared com-
ponent IDMC matches, as seen in the results from the 4SF algorithm. Due to the lower
tolerance the 4SF algorithm has already shown in handling disguises, we see an unsurpris-
ingly high number of subjects affect by IDMC for the vast majority of disguises. The only
disguises for which IDMC is under 95% are the hat (“H” and “Hb”) and eyebrow-covering
(“EBl,” “EBr,” and “EBb”) disguises. These low numbers are due to a large percentage of
the incorrect matches being against other subjects in their “Clean” or “As Arrived” images,
which do not contain any disguise components.
Figure 8.14: Subjects affected by IDMC with the 4SF algorithm, for each disguise.
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If we examine Figure 8.15, however, we can see that for the eyebrow-covering dis-
guises, a majority of the incorrect matches involve IDMC, with at least 60% of incorrect
matches involving a match against the exact disguise. Further inspection shows that for
every disguise (barring the hat and eyebrow-covering disguises), the vast majority of in-
correct matches involving IDMC. This further confirms that the 4SF algorithm is failing to
recognize many of the disguises as objects separate from the subject’s face.
Figure 8.15: Percent of incorrect matches caused by IDMC with the 4SF algorithm.
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Finally, in Figure 8.16, we present the average number of IDMC matches per affected
subject for the 4SF algorithm. We can see that for each subject affected by IDMC, they
were on average incorrectly matched against a large number of other subjects.5 For those
IDMCs which are of the “exact same” disguise, this is the number of unique subjects to
which a subject was incorrectly matched. For example, each subject wearing the “EBb-
FM” disguise was (on average) matched against 217 other subjects wearing the exact same
disguise.
Figure 8.16: Average number of IDMC matches per affected subject with the 4SF algo-
rithm.
5Please note that the scale of the y-axis for this figure is double that of the same figure (Figure 8.13) for
the COTS system. The two should not be compared without taking into account this difference in scale.
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Analysis
Intra-Disguise MisClassification provides an additional axis of disguise for those persons
who may want to disguise themselves. Although an ideal disguise would prevent recog-
nition (or detection) entirely, a disguise that leads the system to erroneously return a very
large number of likely matches may also be effective. For example, the “Swd” disguise was
100% effective at preventing recognition against the 4SF algorithm, and over 56% effective
against the COTS system. However, for both of these systems a large number of matches
involving IDMC were returned: for COTS, the average was 66 exact IDMCs per subject,
while the number for 4SF was a staggering 273, or 85% of the subjects in DFACED.
As another example, we present the results for the “Swc” disguise, based on the results
from the COTS system. From Figure 8.11, we know that every subject who had a face
detected while wearing the white (sun)glasses with clear lenses was incorrectly matched
to another subject wearing the same disguise. From Figure 8.12 we know that 75% of
these incorrect matches involved matching against other subjects wearing the “exact same”
disguise. Finally, from Figure 8.13, we know that for each of these subjects, they were (on
average) incorrectly matched against 146 other subjects wearing the exact same disguise.
Simultaneously, the effectiveness of the “Swc” disguise was less than 3% – but if the
system can be overwhelmed by a large number of possible matches involving similarly
dressed (or deliberately identically disguised) people, locating the correct gallery match
may prove difficult. This could even be used as an attack vector: a group of people all
wearing similar (or identical) accessories could possibly prevent themselves from being
singly identified, with an FR system instead returning a large volume of erroneous matches
from within the group. This method may be especially useful for subjects with low dis-
guisability who otherwise find it difficult to successfully disguise themselves.
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8.5 Detection versus Recognition
Finally, we examine the performance of each of the algorithms with respect to the detection
and recognition stages of their FR algorithm. We define detection for both systems as any
image for which enrollment was accomplished (i.e., a face was detected and a template
was successfully generated for the image). Recognition is defined as any image that scored
greater than 0 on CMP (i.e., was correctly matched against at least one of the subject’s
clean images).
We first present a comparison between the detection and recognition rates of the COTS
system, in Figure 8.17. In the figure, we can clearly see that although the recognition rate
often falls by a small margin, it is largely comparable to the detection rate. These results
also show that the only combinations where a face is detected but the disguise remains
100% effective against the COTS system are “DM-FM” and “H-DM-FM,” which incorpo-
rate both a domino mask and a face mask.
Figure 8.17: Detection versus recognition rates for the COTS FR system.
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Next, in Figure 8.18, we compare the detection rate of the two FR methods. The
4SF algorithm appears to clearly outperform the COTS system in detecting faces on even
heavily-disguised faces. For example, the “H-S-FM” disguise, which was undetectable by
the COTS system, is reported as detected on 18% of subjects by 4SF.
Figure 8.18: Comparison of detection rates between the COTS system and the 4SF algo-
rithm.
However, upon viewing the recognition rate of the 4SF algorithm in comparison, as
seen in Figure 8.19, it becomes clear that the high detection rate is erroneous. We can see
that the “H-S-FM” disguise, for which a face was reported as detected in 18% of subjects,
returns a 0% recognition rate. Although a face was detected in the image, 4SF was not
able to correctly match the detected face to the same subject’s clean images. If we further
examine these disguises where detection was high, but recognition was low, we will notice
a pattern.
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Figure 8.19: Detection versus recognition rates for the 4SF algorithm.
A majority of these detections did not result in correct recognitions, and through closer
examination of the produced results, we can better understand the cause. In the following
figures, we present a selection of detections as recorded by 4SF, with two bright green dots
for each of the eyes, and a bounding box drawn around the face. (We have enlarged the
size of the dots and bounding box, to make their location more apparent.)
In Figure 8.20, we show the detections for three subjects wearing domino masks. The
two subjects on the left have had their eyes correctly located, but the leftmost subject’s
bounding box erroneously stops at the top of the domino mask. On the right, the subject’s
left eye (on our right) has been located, but his right eye has been “detected” as being
situated in the hair on the side of his head; the bounding box was drawn around the entirety
of the image, up to the edges of the frame. For all three of these subjects, recognition of the
domino mask disguise failed. From this, we can see that a face can be correctly detected,
with the feature positions correctly marked (for the most part), but the data that is encoded
as the “face” is so altered by disguise that recognition is then impossible.
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Figure 8.20: Detections by the 4SF algorithm for three subjects wearing the “DM” disguise.
In Figure 8.21, we show the detections for three subjects wearing the sunglasses dis-
guise with black frames and dark lenses. In all three images, the dots for the eyes are
incorrectly placed; for the far right subject, the two dots are even placed at significantly
different locations vertically. Although all of the bounding boxes were drawn correctly,
none of these detected subjects were recognized by the 4SF algorithm. (In fact, none of the
325 DFACED subjects were correctly recognized by the 4SF algorithm while wearing the
“Sbd” disguise.) In this case, the disguise has occluded the features enough to confuse the
algorithm into “detecting” incorrect features, preventing later recognition.
Figure 8.21: Detections by the 4SF algorithm for three subjects wearing the “Sbd” disguise.
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Finally, in Figure 8.22, we can see a sample of false “faces” detected by the 4SF al-
gorithm. In the two examples on the left, a “face” was detected in the stitching on the
upper edge of the surgical face mask. In the center example, the “face” is detected in the
frame of the sunglasses, around the stud that affixes the arms to the frame. And in the
two examples on the right, the highlights and shadows on the bridge of the sunglasses are
where a “face” is detected. All of these examples come from images of subjects wearing
the “H-S-FM” disguise, in which no features (barring an occasional partial eyebrow) are
present. Given the lack of a true face to detect, the algorithm has instead detected faces in
the noise introduced by the disguises themselves.
Figure 8.22: False detections of “faces” in noise introduced by the “H-S-FM” disguise.
Lastly, we compare the recognition results of the two FR methods in Figure 8.23. Al-
though 4SF is underperforming in many cases in comparison to the COTS system, by ex-
amining the disguises that resulted in these recognition failures, we can better understand
the weaknesses in the 4SF algorithm. Those disguises with a large discrepancy between
the two algorithms most often include disguise components that cover one or both eyes:
sunglasses, the domino mask, and full eyepatches (“El” and “Er”). Although the domino
mask does not technically cover the eyes, it masks and “removes” the information provided
by the surrounding area.
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Figure 8.23: Comparison of recognition rates between the COTS system and the 4SF algo-
rithm.
We showcase this comparison between recognition and detection performance in order
to highlight the distinction between a face and features. Although it may be possible to
discern that a face is present in an image, identifying the correct features is often much
more difficult. As an example, we present Figure 8.24, in which subjects wear the “H-S-
FM” disguise, obscuring all detectable facial features. The COTS system (correctly) fails
to both detect and recognize any of the subjects while wearing this disguise. The 4SF
algorithm “detects” faces in 18% of the subjects, but fails to match any of these detected
faces to the correct subject.
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Figure 8.24: Subjects wearing the “H-S-FM” disguise.
To those seeking to conceal their identity, these false “detections” provide an advantage
in comparison to disguises which prevent detection entirely. The latter may raise suspi-
cion from human observers, who would likely notice the failure of the system to detect a
face they can clearly discern. Instead, the scenario of a false detection (in which a face
is detected, but a subsequent attempt to find a match fails) is essentially identical to the
mundane scenario in which a person is simply not present in the gallery.
One form of an ideal disguise would be one that allows someone to register as de-
tectable (while also remaining unrecognizable), without raising the suspicions of those
around them. Although the condition of remaining inconspicuous rules out some of the dis-
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guise components included in DFACED, incorporating more sophisticated disguises could
make this an incredibly effective option for disguise.
8.6 Hypothetical Models for Results
Conclusively identifying the root causes behind these results requires significant additional
work. However, we can offer a number of compelling hypothetical causes underlying the
results we have examined here. It may also be the case that these results are a combination
of two or more of these theoretical models, or a combination of these theoretical models
with other rationales not presented here.
Again, we take a moment to remind the reader that the results presented here apply
only to the specific COTS technology and 4SF algorithm we used for testing. Additionally,
because the COTS software we acquired is a black box with respect to its algorithm, the
hypotheses we put forth as explanations for its results are speculative. Further testing with
additional COTS FR systems would be necessary to solidify the veracity of the hypothetical
models presented here. We welcome further testing of the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE
by the research community, and look forward to their results, whether they corroborate or
refute the theories we put forth here.
8.6.1 Coverage
The first possible cause we present for these results is that of coverage: specifically, that
as coverage of the face increases, so does the effectiveness of the disguise. This follows
conventional wisdom: as the amount of the face available for recognition decreases, so does
recognition rate. Ultimately, a paper bag over the head is the perfect disguise, preventing
all attempts at face detection or recognition. Of course, a paper bag is also conspicuous and
awkward to wear.
Analyzing the performance of the disguises against both FR methods, and over the full
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DFACED subject pool, we can see the effects of thiis hypothesis in action. As seen in Sec-
tion 8.1, against both the COTS system and the 4SF algorithm, the baseball hat disguises
(“H” and “Hb”), which cover very little of the face, are largely ineffective. The mustache
(“M”) and eyebrow-covering disguises (“EBb,” “EBl,” and “EBr”) also have minimal ef-
fectiveness against both systems. Although these disguises provide some coverage, the
mustache is commonly seen “in the wild,” where people grow out and remove facial hair
regularly, and it is a disguise that FR systems are likely to have been trained on. The
eyebrow-covering disguises are obscuring a feature with few distinguishing characteristics,
and are hence not removing a significant amount of information.
We have also previously observed that two or more disguises in combination can per-
form far better than either of the disguise components alone, or even better than the sum of
the two, as discussed in Section 8.2. Even with the addition of an ineffective disguise, such
as the baseball hat, we see an increase in the total disguise’s effectiveness. For specific
examples, we refer the reader back to Figures 8.4 and 8.5.
8.6.2 Contrast
A second hypothesis is that many of these divergences in performance are caused by dif-
ferences in the level of contrast between a disguise and the subject’s skin tone. As put forth
by Alexander and Smith [5], in addition to a decline in accuracy due to occlusion of the
features, recognition is further degraded by a disguise that creates a high contrast with the
surrounding area of the face. In fact, we posit that in some cases, contrast may have more
of an effect on disguise effectiveness than facial coverage.
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Figure 8.25: The “FM2” (left) and “FM3” (right) disguises.
To illustrate this, we examine two of the variations of the face mask disguise, seen in
Figure 8.25 (“FM2” (nose uncovered) and “FM3” (nose and chin uncovered)), and their
performance against the COTS system. By coverage alone, “FM2” should be the more
effective disguise, as it covers the subject’s chin, while “FM3” does not. In Figure 8.26, we
present the effectiveness of the two disguises as grouped by subject skin tone. We can see
that for a vast majority of subjects, there is an increase in disguise effectiveness for “FM3,”
despite the lower coverage that disguise provides.
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Figure 8.26: Comparison of disguise effectiveness across skin tones for “FM2” and “FM3”
disguises, as measured against the COTS system.
However, if we examine these results in the context of contrast, rather than coverage,
the additional exposure of the subject’s chin adds another location with the possibility for
high contrast between the subject’s skin tone and the disguise. We can see in Figure 8.26
that the increase in effectiveness is most pronounced for subjects with darker skin tones,
further supporting this hypothesis. In Figure 8.27, we present a sample of four disguises
whose performance also illustrates the effect of contrast on disguise effectiveness. The two
subjects shown belong to the second lightest and second darkest skin tone groups.
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100% effective 88% effective 100% effective 74% effective
26% effective 54% effective 53% effective 0% effective
Figure 8.27: Four examples of effective (top row) and ineffective (bottom row) disguises,
presented on subjects with light and dark skin tones.
8.6.3 Alignment
As mentioned previously in Section 7.1.2, the images used for testing were not aligned
prior to training or testing. By design, in many of the DFACED images, these features are
hidden (e.g., sunglasses) or are difficult to detect (e.g., the domino mask, which removes
contextual data surrounding the eyes). Although we briefly considered manual marking
of the facial features, the idea was rejected: the task of annotating such a large number
of images would have been highly labor-intensive and time-consuming. Undoubtedly, this
affected the performance of both facial recognition methods, with the 4SF algorithm likely
being the most heavily affected, as the algorithm relies heavily on correctly determining
the location of the eyes.
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8.6.4 Demographic Variation in Automated Face Recognition
Finally, as discussed in Section 4.3, there is the possibility that the FR systems used were
affected by the demographics of the training population. This is especially likely for the
COTS system, which was pre-trained on a data set by the commercial company that pro-
duced it.
We examined the results from both systems to determine the number of subjects whose
clean (undisguised) images were incorrectly matched against another subject’s clean im-
ages. For the COTS system, 24.5% of subjects were incorrectly matched against at least
one other subject when undisguised. For the 4SF algorithm, the number is much higher, at
77.18% of subjects being incorrectly matched against at least one other undisguised sub-
ject.
Additionally, against the COTS system, many of the subjects who were incorrectly
matched were younger East Asian women. When we take into account that the COTS
system we used was developed by a Western company, this lends credence to the theory
that a lack of training data containing East Asian women contributed to this discrepancy in
performance.
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Chapter 9
Future Work and Conclusions
In this dissertation, we have described a substantial new database of facial imagery, the
DISGUISED FACE DATABASE (DFACED). DFACED is characterized both by the diversity
of the imaged population and the number of example disguises applied consistently to
every member of the subject population. We have used DFACED to perform a data-driven
analysis of the performance of disguises using a highly-rated COTS FR system and an
open-source testing framework.
The results reported here are based on explaining phenomena observed from a bottom-
up analysis. However, given the richness of the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE, the op-
portunity exists to address many additional questions. In this chapter, we will discuss the
numerous ways in which the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE could be used by other re-
searchers to further current FR technology. This includes the possibility of significantly
increasing the size of the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE with only a fraction of the effort
required to initially create it. We close this dissertation with a brief summary of the work
and its contributions.
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9.1 Future Work
We believe that the work accomplished and the results presented in this dissertation show
the value of the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE as a resource for the face recognition re-
search community. Thanks to the richness of the DFACED data, there are considerably
more avenues of research to be explored, and an abundance of further discoveries to be
made. Although this work is outside the scope of this dissertation, we present a selec-
tion of these research opportunities below in the hopes of inspiring future works using the
DISGUISED FACE DATABASE.
9.2 Distribution to Research Community and Additional
Testing
Currently, when researchers create new face recognition algorithms that tackle occlusion,
the databases on which they can test are few. The databases available to them were ei-
ther not designed with occlusions in mind, lack up-to-date imagery, or contain small, non-
diverse subject pools.
Labeled Faces in the Wild [71] and the CMU PIE [135] and Multi-PIE [66] databases,
which were discussed in Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 respectively, do contain occlusions. How-
ever, these occlusions are incidental in the case of LFW, or are caused by lighting and pose
in PIE and Multi-PIE. The AR Face database [101], discussed in Section 4.1.1, is nearly 20
years old, with image resolutions of only 768 x 576 pixels. Although it has 126 subjects,
it contains only two disguises, and all images of subjects are shot “head on.” Finally, the
IIITD ID V1 database [38, 39], discussed in Section 4.1.6, is a recently gathered database
that focuses on occlusions. However, the database lacks a consistently applied set of dis-
guises, was shot exclusively from the “head on” view, and the subject pool is small (75
subjects) and lacking in demographic diversity.
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Despite these drawbacks, researchers interested in exploring occlusion’s effects on face
recognition have come to rely on them [38, 39, 80, 106, 167]. It was this increasing need
for a comprehensive database of disguised faces that lead to the creation of the DISGUISED
FACE DATABASE. The multiple camera angles (discussed in Section 5.1.2), diverse subject
demographics (Section 6.2), and “subjectless” disguise images (Section 5.6.3) were all
included with the goal of creating a database that was useful to as many researchers as
possible.
It is our hope that FR researchers will be able to take advantage of the DISGUISED
FACE DATABASE to improve the state-of-the art in face recognition, and to expand the
community’s understanding of occlusion’s effects. It may even prove useful to researchers
outside the fields of computer vision and machine learning researchers, such as researchers
in the field of psychology.
9.3 Human Evaluation
The accuracy of machine-based face recognition systems has long been compared to that of
humans [28, 39, 125, 138]. In the 2006 FRVT tests, “seven automatic face recognition algo-
rithms were comparable to or better than humans at recognizing faces taken under different
lighting conditions” [125]. Although these algorithms now outperform humans on recog-
nition of unfamiliar faces, humans are still more adept at recognizing familiar faces [138].
However, except for work by Dhamecha et al. [39], very little has been done to test hu-
man face recognition when presented with disguised subjects, or to evaluate the ability of
humans to recognize familiar versus unfamiliar subjects when the subject is disguised.
The DISGUISED FACE DATABASE could be used to study human versus FR system
performance, and if such a study was conducted at Penn in the near future, it could also be
used to examine the effects of familiarity with the subjects. We believe that the results of
such a human evaluation would provide valuable insights not only for the face recognition
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community, but also for researchers in neuroscience and cognitive science.
9.4 “Subjectless” Disguises
As discussed in Section 5.6.3, in addition to disguised faces, DFACED also contains images
of each disguise and disguise combination as captured on a featureless CPR dummy. The
dummy images are more easily edited to remove the “subject,” leaving only the disguise,
which still follows the general curves of a human face.
9.4.1 Expand the Database
Expanding the database by artificially applying the disguises is one possible way in which
the “subjectless” disguises may be put to use. They could be used to create new com-
binations; as discussed in Section 5.4.2, only a small fraction of the possible disguise
combinations were captured. There still remain 136 combinations that could be created
(not including the variations in the mustache and face mask, as discussed in Sections 5.2.3
and 5.2.4). For example, creating “Swc-FM” (Sunglasses, white frames, clear lenses and
Face Mask) or “Hb-EBb-M” (Hat, backwards and Eyebrows, both covered, and Mustache).
Furthermore, expansion of the database in this manner need not be limited to subjects
from DFACED, or even to subjects already captured. For example, the disguises could be
applied to subjects from CMU Multi-PIE [66], including the profile and 45 degree views,
as dummy images were captured using all five cameras. Using this technique, the subject
pool of the original DISGUISED FACE DATABASE could be expanded and diversified, and
could also include disguised images of the same subject months, years, or even decades
apart.
Finally, expansion of the disguise set is also a distinct possibility, by capturing addi-
tional disguises on a similar CPR dummy. These “subjectless” disguises could then be
applied to DFACED subjects, or to subjects from other databases. There were a number of
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disguise types we had to reject for various reasons.
For example, more realistic facial hair, additional hats (e.g., beanies, cowboy hats), bal-
aclavas, and scarves (around the lower half of the face) were not possible. Due to sanitary
reasons, individual items needed to be provided for each subject, and this was not monetar-
ily feasible. Likewise, involved disguises such as realistic prosthetics, hijabs, turbans, and
wigs, were too time-intensive to apply individually to each subject. If these disguises were
applied to a CPR dummy and then artificially applied to subjects, the materials become a
one-time cost and the time required is significantly reduced.
We must emphasize that these artifically applied disguises may not perform in an iden-
tical manner to disguises worn in actuality by subjects. It was for this reason that DFACED
was gathered using subjects who were wearing each of the disguises in real life, rather
than augmenting an existing data set. However, if artifical disguises can be used to pro-
vide results similar enough to those of the disguises currently in the DISGUISED FACE
DATABASE, they can be used to greatly expand and improve the utility of the database.
9.4.2 Improving Face Recognition
In addition to database expansion, “subjectless” disguises can also be applied to the prob-
lem of face recognition itself. The disguises could be used to help identify occlusions in
images taken, and to mitigate their effects. For example, if an image is captured of a person
wearing a disguise, the “subjectless” disguises could be used to aid the system in identify-
ing the disguise(s) being worn. This would allow the system to more precisely ignore the
disguise, similar to the technique of splitting the face, as discussed in Section 4.2.4, but
with all relevant pixels retained.
It may also be used to improve the algorithms themselves, by allowing additional train-
ing through the expanded datasets discussed in the previous section. Gallery subjects could
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also be enrolled in multiple disguises and disguise combinations with no additional effort
necessary during enrollment. This could produce improved accuracy against future probe
images where the subject is disguised.
Finally, as we discuss in further detail in Section 9.6, it may be possible to use artificial
disguise application to determine the most effective disguise for an individual against a
specific FR system. This knowledge could help identify weak spots in an FR system,
allowing targeted improvements to be made. Conversely, the knowledge could be used to
improve the effectiveness of particular disguises.
9.5 Utilization of Additional Data
In addition to the “subjectless” disguise images captured on the CPR dummy, there is a
significant amount of additional data available in the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE. This
includes a considerable volume of undisguised data which may be useful for FR researchers
whose focus is not occlusion.
9.5.1 Additional Views and Second Sessions
In addition to the disguised images, DFACED contains a great deal of valuable undisguised
facial data. First and foremost, profile and side views that correspond to every “head on”
image taken, including those of the subject as they arrived (“AA”) and each of the clean
shots gathered during each session, are available in the database.
These additional profile and side views also allow extensive testing on non-ideal “field”
cases. For example, matching a disguised “head on” probe to an undisguised profile in the
gallery. Additionally, 245 of the subjects returned for a second session at least 30 days later,
as discussed in Section 5.5. This second set of images could also provide more realistic test
scenarios, such as a disguised probe compared to an undisguised gallery image captured
two months prior.
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9.5.2 Kinect and Blinking Images
The database also contains images from a Kinect sensor, captured simultaneously in both
2D and 3D, as discussed in Section 5.6.1. These Kinect images provide additional re-
sources to researchers looking to explore combining 2D and 3D imagery to improve FR.
The possibility also exists to incorporate the additional views (discussed in the previous
section) with the 3D imagery to create a 3D model with the correct facial textures.
And, as discussed in Section 5.6.2, images of each subject blinking were taken with
the express purpose of making them available to other researchers. DFACED includes the
capture of a series of “true” blinks from camera c3, as well as a “simulated” blink captured
from all five camera angles. There currently exists no other database of humans blinking,
and possibly as a result there is a distinct lack of research on how blinking affects face
recognition; the blinking data in DFACED was gathered solely for use in future research.
9.6 The Disguise-O-Matic
The Disguise-O-Matic is an ambitious project that would involve the creation of a program
to predict which disguises would work best for an individual. Although the concept is
somewhat “pie in the sky,” such a program would have many possible applications. These
uses range from effectively disguising undercover operatives to allowing average citizens
to maintain their privacy with minimal modifications to their appearance.
Ideally, the Disguise-O-Matic would take imagery of a subject’s face and recommend
effective disguises, either through comparison with similar subjects and their results in
DFACED, or by artificially applying disguises and then testing their effectiveness, using
DFACED or other databases as part of the gallery.
It may also be used to determine which disguises should and should not be allowed for
each individual in a cooperative capture situation. For example, can a specific employee
continue wearing his sunglasses during authentication, or does he need to remove them? If
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another employee is sick, is it necessary for her to remove her face mask (possibly exposing
others to her illness), or can she be accurately identified while wearing it?
9.7 Conclusions
In this work, we have presented a substantial new database of facial imagery, the DIS-
GUISED FACE DATABASE (DFACED), which is characterized both by the diversity of its
population and the number of example disguises applied consistently to each and every
member of the subject population. DFACED was used to perform a data-driven analysis
of the performance of disguises using both a highly-rated commercial FR system and an
open-source testing framework.
The work presented in this dissertation has proven the following things to be true:
First, that in spite of the many advances in FR technology, as chronicled in the NIST-
organized series of Face Recognition Vendor Tests [12, 67, 123, 125], the data unambigu-
ously shows that even a single simple disguise (such as those from party supply vendors)
can be very effective at preventing identification.
Second, there exist definitive differences in disguise effectiveness both between individ-
uals and between subject groupings, including subjects grouped by skin tone and subjects
grouped by race and gender.
Third, there are multiple avenues through which occlusive disguises can be exploited
to prevent a face recognition system from successfully performing identification, including
preventing detection entirely, as well as overwhelming the system by wearing a disguise
that produces a large number of erroneous results.
Fourth, elements such as coverage, contrast, and disguise combination are determina-
tive factors in the success or failure of face recognition algorithms both in general and for
an individual.
Fifth, individual FR algorithms react to the use of disguise with varying degrees of pro-
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ficiency, causing the effectiveness of individual disguises to vary widely across FR meth-
ods.
Finally, the results presented in this dissertation illustrate the possibilities of what can
be achieved using the DISGUISED FACE DATABASE, and that this database can be utilized
to make significant progress in understanding and improving face recognition systems.
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Appendix A
Disguise Abbreviations
This appendix begins by providing a quick reference table for the disguise abbreviations.
The rest of this appendix lists each of the images taken during a capture session, in order
of capture. The disguise description and the disguise’s abbreviation are included in the
caption of each image.
In the abbreviations, capital letters are used to refer to the disguise component (e.g., “S”
for Sunglasses, “DM” for Domino Mask). Lowercase letters are used for disguise modifiers
(e.g., in “Sbd”, “b” refers to the black frames of the sunglasses, and “d” to the dark lenses).
Finally, in the case of combination disguises, disguises are listed in order from the top of
the subject’s head to the bottom (e.g., “H-S-M” refers to Hat (top of the head), Sunglasses
(below the hat), and Mustache (below the sunglasses)).
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Disguise Code Meaning
“AA” As Arrived (The subject in their street clothes.)
“C#” Clean image (The subject in a lab coat with all accesories removed.) §
“DM” Domino Mask
“EBb” both EyeBrows covered
“EBl” (subject’s) left EyeBrow covered
“EBr” (subject’s) right EyeBrow covered
“El” (subject’s) left Eye covered
“Er” (subject’s) right Eye covered
“FM1” Face Mask (full coverage) †
“FM2” Face Mask (nose exposed)
“FM3” Face Mask (nose and chin exposed)
“H” baseball Hat
“Hb” baseball Hat worn backwards
“M” Mustache
“Sbc” Sunglasses, black frames with clear lenses
“Sbd” Sunglasses, black frames with dark lenses ‡
“Swc” Sunglasses, white frames with clear lenses
“Swd” Sunglasses, white frames with dark lenses
§ There are six Clean images in total, referred to as “C1” through “C6” in order.
†When part of a multi-component disguise, “FM” refers to this disguise.
‡When part of a multi-component disguise, “S” refers to this disguise.
Table A.1: Reference table for disguise abbreviations.
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As Arrived
“AA”
(The subject in their street clothes.)
Clean, first image
“C1”
(The subject has donned a lab coat and
removed all accessories.)
Face Mask (full coverage)
“FM1”
Face Mask (nose exposed)
“FM2”
163
Face mask (nose and chin exposed)
“FM3”
Clean, second image
“C2”
Eye, (subject’s) right
“Er”
Eye, (subject’s) left
“El”
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EyeBrow, (subject’s) right
“EBr”
EyeBrow, both
“EBb”
EyeBrow, both & Face Mask
“EBb-FM”
EyeBrow, (subject’s) left
“EBl”
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Clean, third image
“C3”
Sunglasses, black (frames), dark
(lenses)
“Sbd”
Sunglasses, black (frames), clear
(lenses)
“Sbc”
Sunglasses, white (frames), dark
(lenses)
“Swd”
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Sunglasses, white (frames), clear
(lenses)
“Swc”
Sunglasses (black frames, dark
lenses) & Face Mask
“S-FM”
(baseball) Hat & Sunglasses & Face
Mask
“H-S-FM”
Hat & Face Mask
“H-FM”
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Hat & Sunglasses
“H-S”
(baseball) Hat
“H”
Hat, backwards
“Hb”
Clean, fourth image
“C4”
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Domino Mask
“DM”
Domino Mask & Face Mask
“DM-FM”
Hat & Domino Mask & Face Mask
“H-DM-FM”
Hat & Domino Mask
“H-DM”
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Clean, fifth image
“C5”
Mustache
“M”
Domino Mask & Mustache
“DM-M”
Hat & Mustache
“H-M”
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Hat & Sunglasses & Mustache
“H-S-M”
Sunglasses & Mustache
“S-M”
Clean, sixth image
“C6”
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Appendix B
OpenBR Commands
In this appendix, we present annotated OpenBR commands, which were used to train the
4SF algorithm, to enroll the subjects into galleries, and to perform the tests from which we
draw our results.
B.1 Training Commands
br -algorithm FaceRecognition -train clean only FR clean
This command trains the FaceRecognition algorithm (the 4SF algorithm) on the clean
images of all of the subjects. The command is passed the address of a folder that contains
only clean subject images, with each subject’s images contained in a separate subfolder
labeled with their subject number. The trained algorithm is stored in the file FR clean.
B.2 Gallery Creation Commands
Gallery creation commands were used to create galleries where the images are enrolled,
then encoded and stored for quick retrieval later. Each gallery creation typically took
around 10 minutes, and “loading” the created galleries for use was nearly instantaneous.
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br -algorithm FR clean -enrollAll -enroll DFD files noFolder/
gal FR clean.gal
This command calls the FR clean algorithm, which has previously been trained, and
the enrollAll flag is set. This flag is used when the images are not expected to have
exactly one output template. Many of the DFACED images will fail to enroll (because they
lack a face detectable by algorithm); as a consequence, there will be some images for which
the expected number of templates is zero.
The command passes in the entirety of the DFD files noFolder directory, which
contains all of the DFACED files in a single folder (as opposed to being separated into
subfolders). It outputs the final gallery to the gal FR clean.gal binary file, named
directly after the trained algorithm used to create it.
B.3 Comparison Commands
Comparison commands were used to compare each image to an already enrolled gallery,
using the same previously trained algorithm used to create the gallery. A python script was
used to generate a txt file that contained all of the necessary commands, which were then
run from the command line using bash.
br -algorithm FR clean -compare
DFD files noFolder/1001.1 c3 C1 1.jpg gallery FR clean.gal
> oBRCompare FR clean 1001.1 c3 C1 1.txt
This is an example of a command generated by the python script. It calls the FR clean
algorithm, which was previously trained, and asks it to compare the image (in this ex-
ample, 1001.1 c3 C1 1.jpg) to the gallery previously generated using that algorithm
(gallery FR clean.gal). The output is then redirected and stored inside a txt file
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(oBRCompare FR clean 1001.1 c3 C1 1.txt), whose name incorporates both the
algorithm used and the file upon which the compare was run.
The rest of the file contains similar generated commands that are used to compare each
of the other images. The file’s commands are run via bash invocation.
B.4 Enrollment Commands
The gallery files, discussed in Section B.2, are stored in an unreadable binary format,
which did not allow us to determine detection rate. Without this information, we would
be unable to perform later comparison between detection and recognition, as discussed in
Section 8.5. Instead, the following commands were used to individually enroll each image,
providing us with the details o the detection rate. A python script was used to generate a txt
file that contained all of the necessary commands, which were then run from the command
line using bash.
br -algorithm FR clean -enrollAll -enroll 1001.1 c3 M 1.jpg
&> FR clean temps/oBRTemp FR clean 1001.1 c3 M 1.txt
This is an example of the generated commands. It calls the FR clean algorithm,
which has already been trained. The algorithm is asked to enroll the image (in this example,
1001.1 c3 M 1.jpg), and sets the -enrollAll flag, as discussed in Section B.2.
The &> is used to redirect stderr, the stream to which OpenBR outputs its results,
to a txt file. The captured output is saved in the folder FR clean temps (a folder of the
templates generated by the FR clean algorithm), in a file named directly after the image
upon which the enrollment was run.
The rest of the file contains similar generated commands that are used to enroll all of
the other image files. The file’s commands are run via bash invocation.
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Appendix C
Additional Graphs and Tables
In this table, we show the disguises used in calculating the “shared components” IDMC
matches, mentioned in Section 8.4. On the left, we list the individual disguise components,
and on the right list all of the disguises which were counted as containing components of
that disguise. For example, if calculating the “shared components” IDMC matches for the
disguise “DM-M”, we would include “DM,” “DM-FM,” “DM-M,” “H-DM,” and “H-DM-
FM” for the “DM” component of the disguise, in addition to the “H-M,” “H-S-M,” “M,”
and “S-M” disguises for the “M” component of the disguise.
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Original Disguise Contains Disguises with Shared Components
“DM” “DM,” “DM-FM,” “DM-M,” “H-DM,”
“H-DM-FM”
“EBb,” “EBl,” or “EBr” “EBb,” “EBb-FM,” “EBl,” “EBr”
“El” “El”
“El” “Er”
“FM1,” “FM2,” or “FM3” “DM-FM,” “EBb-FM,” “FM1,” “FM2,” “FM3,”
“H-DM-FM,” “H-FM,” “H-S-FM,” “S-FM”
“H” and “Hb” “H,” “H-DM,” “H-DM-FM,” “H-FM,” “H-M,”
“H-S,” “H-S-FM,” “Hb”
“M” “DM-M,” “H-M,” “H-S-M,” “M,” “S-M”
“Sbc,” “Sbd,” “Swc,” or “Swd” “H-S,” “H-S-FM,” “H-S-M,” “S-FM,” “S-M,”
“Sbc,” “Sbd,” “Swc,” “Swd”
Table C.1: Disguises used to calculated IDMC matches containing “shared components.”
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